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Anything Goes: 
Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from 
Controversial Speech 
 
Catherine J. Ross* 
 
In olden days, a glimpse of stocking 
Was looked on as something shocking. 
But now, God knows, 
Anything goes. 
-- Cole Porter, Anything Goes (1934) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Protecting children from contamination by speech has become the focus of national attention. 
The content of the protected speech that the state seeks to regulate is as varied as the form of com-
munications targeted, including the allegedly indecent, sacrilegious, and violent in media ranging 
from books to the Internet. Echoing similar crusades to protect children from virtually every new 
form of entertainment over the last century, contemporary regulatory efforts to protect children re-
flect the unique legal status of children and the fragility of constitutional liberties where their vul-
nerabilities are invoked. But content-based restrictions on speech--even in the name of protecting 
young people--presumptively violate the First Amendment,1 which mandates “above all else . . . 
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter or its content.”2 
Strict scrutiny under the Speech Clause requires the government to demonstrate a compelling in-
terest in regulating speech based on its content and to show that a real harm exists which the restric-
tion on speech will redress. Confronted with the incantation that the state aims to safeguard chil-
dren, courts at every level, including the Supreme Court, have regularly failed to scrutinize the in-
terest alleged by the government. This lack of analysis is all the more striking because the speech at 
issue in this Article is protected under the Constitution. It is neither legally obscene nor used in the 
service of criminal acts against children. Both of these categories of speech are unprotected, and are 
subject to criminal prosecution under pertinent statutes. 
Although many parents and other adults might wish it were otherwise, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that as long as controversial speech is available, some “enterprising youngsters” will 
find it.3 The Supreme Court has conceded that no “fail-safe” methods can block the most deter-
mined teen, especially since government regulations based on content must be narrowly tailored.4 
The Supreme Court has long held as inviolable the principle that even the desire to protect youth 
will not allow the state to “reduce the adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for children.”5 
Regardless of the strength of the government’s interest in protecting children, the Court has insisted 
that “the level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be 
suitable for a sandbox.”6 
 
 
One case stemming from efforts to shield children from controversial speech was recently ar-
gued before the Supreme Court and a second is likely to reach the Court during the next term: Play-
boy Entertainment Group v. United States (“Playboy II”), involving control of transmissions from 
subscription adult cable channels so that they do not inadvertently reach non-subscribers,7 and 
ACLU v. Reno (“ACLU II”), involving the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”),8 which limits 
commercial computer communications deemed “harmful to minors.”9 Over the last decade, the Su-
preme Court has ruled on three other cases involving the constitutionality of federal efforts to regu-
late speech in order to shelter children from content: Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,10 Denver 
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,11 and Reno v. ACLU (“ACLU 
I”).12 In each instance, the Court rejected the state’s argument that the goal of shielding children jus-
tified significant intrusions on constitutionally protected speech; in each instance, the Supreme 
Court overturned all or part of the statute at issue. The holding in each of the cases in the trilogy re-
iterated the Supreme Court’s express statement in Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas that the “salu-
tary purpose of protecting children” does not insulate government action from constitutional scru-
tiny.13 But remarkably, in each of these three cases, the Supreme Court ignored its own dictates by 
failing to analyze the state’s asserted compelling interest. Instead, the Court readily accepted the 
asserted interest in passing, but found that Congress had exceeded the boundaries of the Speech 
Clause in promulgating the specific regulation.14 Legal questions about the regulation of speech to 
shield children are likely to recur with increasing frequency, judging from the docket of pending 
legislation and statutes not yet tested in the courts.15 
As a threshold matter, courts assessing a challenge to a government regulation under the Speech 
Clause are required to ask whether the interest asserted by the government is strong enough to move 
forward with the applicable test under the First Amendment (normally “strict scrutiny” in the case 
of content restrictions) as opposed to the mere “legitimacy” or “rational basis” required in most leg-
islative review.16 Since the restrictions on speech discussed here are indisputably content-based, the 
government would need to demonstrate a compelling interest to support the regulations. Then, and 
only then, are courts permitted to analyze whether the regulation at issue is indeed “narrowly tai-
lored” to achieve the government’s compelling aims without unduly imposing on protected 
speech.17 
In case after case, courts at all levels have taken, at most, a cursory glance at the government’s 
asserted interest before accepting the government’s position that the interest is “compelling” or 
“significant.”18 Legal scholars have also largely failed to analyze the “compelling interests” asserted 
by the government.19 In a half dozen cases, however, lower courts have scrutinized, and some have 
rejected outright, the government’s proffered rationale for regulations that impinge on First 
Amendment freedoms, holding that the government interest asserted was insufficient as presented.20 
Serious consequences flow from this lack of attention to the nature of the interest served by 
regulating speech in the name of children. First, it leads to the tacit assumption that the govern-
ment’s proclaimed interests are virtually immune from scrutiny once the state invokes the protection 
of children. Second, it suggests that the boundaries of the speech from which children must be pro-
tected are virtually limitless. As a result of an apparent lack of boundaries, government at every 
level has relied on mere generalized assertions in promulgating broad regulations impinging on pro-
tected speech.21 Third, when courts beg the question of the nature of the state’s interest in regulating 
speech to shield the young, they inhibit the development of First Amendment jurisprudence and 
lead emerging doctrine astray. Because courts have not asked the threshold questions required under 
First Amendment doctrine, they have opened the door to using children as an excuse for the state to 
 
 
intrude upon protected speech, suggesting that regulations on speech will survive scrutiny if they 
are narrowly crafted. The cumulative effect of this analytic sloppiness is that courts have glossed 
over the foundation question of whether a compelling state interest in regulating protected speech to 
shield the young exists at all. 
In this Article, I seek to reframe the discussion by calling on courts to force government actors 
to meet their constitutional obligation to articulate clear, compelling interests to justify each regula-
tion of speech imposed under the guise of protecting children. It is imperative that courts examine 
the nature of the government’s alleged compelling interest in protecting children when considering 
regulations on speech because if the government’s interest is insufficient to satisfy the applicable 
constitutional standard, an abridgement of protected speech cannot survive scrutiny, no matter how 
narrowly it is crafted.22 
My discussion focuses on the two compelling interests that the government generally offers for 
regulating speech that might reach children. First, proponents of government regulation of speech 
point to a compelling interest in helping parents to control their children’s exposure to certain kinds 
of communication. Second, the state claims an independent interest in the development of children, 
regardless of the decisions made by their parents.23 
Unfortunately, the entire subject of these compelling interests has been isolated from the grow-
ing literature on the relationship between the state and families.24 The first proposed interest--
reinforcing parental authority--relies on a simplistic view that presumes a harmony between the in-
terests of individual parents and the interests of the state. If the United States were a theocracy, such 
an assumption might be warranted: parents who did not share the nation’s views could be forced to 
do so. But it is a foundational principle of governance in the United States that an on-going tension 
exists and must be tolerated between the constitutional guarantees of individual autonomy and the 
desire for a collective vision of the social good. 
Applied to the relationship between the variety of families and the state, this tension translates 
into perpetual stresses along three sides of a triangle with endpoints labeled PCS: Parent, Child, and 
State. In some instances, the rights and preferences of parent and child will align perfectly, and will 
conflict with those of the state. This configuration is the principle focus of this discussion. In other 
instances, the state may intervene on behalf of the child in opposition to the parents, as in child 
abuse cases. In yet another configuration, a child may seek to exercise rights outside the home in 
opposition to parental wishes, and turn to the state for support, as when a teenager seeks to obtain 
an abortion without parental consent. This Article focuses on situations in which parents either wish 
the child to have access to communications that the state regards as inappropriate or take a more 
restrictive view than the state of what speech is appropriate for their child. 
Proponents of regulation often claim a second compelling interest--an independent interest--
rooted in the government’s generalized commitment to nurture and educate the next generation of 
citizens. Upon examination, this second interest turns out to be no less problematic than the first. 
Constitutionally recognized principles of autonomy and family privacy limit the State’s authority to 
make moral or developmental choices for minors in areas traditionally reserved for their parents or 
guardians.25 To justify intrusions on parental rights and family privacy, proponents of abridging 
speech would need to demonstrate specific harm flowing from the speech. 
Part II of this Article provides a brief historical perspective on long-standing concerns about the 
pernicious effect of new forms of communication on children. Part III defines the universe of pro-
 
 
tected, non-obscene but controversial speech that is at issue. Part IV sets out the test which courts 
are required to use in assessing the existence and strength of the compelling interest the state asserts 
for regulating speech and reveals the failure of the Supreme Court to apply its own standards for 
analyzing the government interest when the government invokes the need to protect children from 
speech. Part V examines the State’s asserted compelling interest in empowering parents to enforce 
their speech choices on minors, including consideration of the varieties of families, family auton-
omy rights, the strength of competing private interests of certain parents and minors, and the poten-
tial conflicts between parental choices and governmental assumptions about social norms. Part VI 
analyzes the government’s proclaimed compelling interest in regulating material available to minors 
based on the State’s independent interest in the well being of its future citizens. Part VII analyzes 
the six evenly divided lower court opinions that have scrutinized the compelling interest put for-
ward by proponents of regulations on speech to shield children, as well as the cases which the Su-
preme Court is expected to decide in the near future. Finally, the conclusion sets forth how scruti-
nizing the government’s compelling interest will restore analytical rigor to an area of law too often 
susceptible to untested intuition supporting the imposition of majoritarian norms at the cost of con-
stitutional liberties. 
II. THE TRADITION OF PROTECTING INNOCENT CHILDREN FROM NEW FORMS OF 
EXPRESSION26 
The public is concerned about what children are hearing and seeing, and to some extent for good 
reason. Popular concern about the volume of exposure to various forms of media and about its con-
tent has spilled over into political discourse.27 Even before the shootings at Columbine High,28 
Senator Robert Byrd proclaimed on the Senate floor: 
 
The political and social environment in which parents must today raise their children is, 
unfortunately, an environment in which anything goes . . . . Profanity, vulgarity, sex 
and violence are pervasive in television programming, in the movies, and in much of 
today’s books that pretend to pass for literature. The nation is inexorably sinking to-
ward the lowest common denominator in its standards and values. Haven’t we had 
enough?29 
 
In response to such anxieties, both federal and state governments have sought to reduce the expo-
sure of children to arguably unsuitable material. 
Regulations aim at communications that emanate from peers,30 as well as those that appear in 
books,31 newspapers and magazines,32 radio broadcasts,33 rock music,34 movies,35 broadcast and ca-
ble television,36 card games,37 video games,38 telecommunications,39 and computer materials--
including the Internet.40 The regulations generally fall into four dominant modes: (i) an outright ban 
on the speech;41 (ii) channeling the speech so that it may only be available at times when children 
are assumed to be least likely to have access to it;42 (iii) using identification requirements to ensure 
that only adults receive the speech;43 and (iv) filtering mechanisms reliant on technology designed 
to help parents and other adults screen speech according to pre-assigned categories and labels at-
tached by others.44 
Many parents and grandparents, including legislators and judges in their individual capacities, 
“would like to see the efforts of Congress to protect children from harmful materials . . . ultimately 
succeed and the will of the majority of citizens in this country to be realized.”45 But they will never 
 
 
succeed in completely shielding the young from exposure to controversial topics because there is 
virtually no information that an enterprising youngster could not pick up from news coverage. The 
highest elected official admits marital infidelity involving fellatio;46 high school students use guns 
to murder their teachers and/or classmates;47 a prominent musician, accused of child molestation, 
reportedly pays millions of dollars to avoid legal penalties;48 international news includes coverage 
of so-called “ethnic cleansing” in the Balkans49 and ethnic slaughter in Africa.50 None of these news 
stories could be barred consistent with the First Amendment.51 
The prevalence of such speech in news coverage underscores the flaws in the dominant mode of 
analyzing speech rights in light of the medium in which the speech occurs. The fragmented analysis 
grows in large part from the Supreme Court’s doctrine that different levels of scrutiny apply to dif-
ferent forms of media52 --with the highest deference traditionally paid to verbal expression and print 
media and the lowest to broadcast media.53 I agree with the many scholars and jurists who question 
the continued vitality of the Supreme Court’s distinction among forms of expression, which reached 
its apex in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.54 Except where it would be unrealistic to do so, the analysis 
here emphasizes the similarities rather than the distinctions among forms of communication.55 For 
purposes of protecting children, the source of the speech makes little difference, except for the dis-
tinction between forms of speech that require literacy and those that do not. 
The argument that the government has an independent interest in regulating protected speech on 
behalf of children rests on the relatively recent social construction of the child as innocent. It is also 
class based. Few observers who sought to protect children from contaminated speech in the nine-
teenth century argued that innocence characterized child laborers in mines and factories, chimney 
sweeps, gutter snipes, or residents of the poorhouses depicted by Charles Dickens. The expansion of 
the notion of child as innocent made such conditions intolerable to social reformers.56 
Regulatory efforts to shield children from controversial speech to preserve their innocence have 
a long lineage. Legal precedent dates back to at least 1868, in the British case of The Queen v. Hick-
linwhich, although unconstrained by the First Amendment, proved influential in the United States.57 
Hicklin enunciated an “obscenity” test designed to protect the lowest common denominator among 
minors and the most vulnerable adults.58 According to Hicklin, the work could be banned entirely if 
it would tend to “deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and 
into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall . . . [and if] it would suggest to the minds of the 
young of either sex . . . thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character.”59 American courts 
adopted the Hicklin standard, which provided a roadmap for nearly a century of jurisprudence on 
obscene and what would now be deemed controversial speech.60 
Moral crusaders persistently justified regulation of every new form of entertainment as neces-
sary to protect the young. Building on social anxieties that associate young people with disorder, 
violence, and uncontrolled libido, they have targeted new forms of speech as a cause of youthful 
immorality, even as they lamented the inability of parents to live up to the trust society has placed in 
them as the primary custodians of their children. The gatekeepers of Anglo-American culture have 
long enlisted the state’s help in limiting the controversial speech available to the young. In England, 
G.K. Chesterton commented on the absurdity of the influence on young reprobates attributed to evil 
reading: “It is firmly fixed in the minds of most people that gutter-boys, unlike everybody else in 
the community, find their principle motives for conduct in printed books.”61 
In the United States, Anthony Comstock personified the movement for state regulation of read-
ing matter and entertainment on the grounds that it was necessary to protect children.62 Satan cre-
 
 
ated titillating traps, he proclaimed, “for boys and girls especially.”63 Comstock demanded that the 
state protect children from a seemingly endless variety of new cultural dangers, including: dime 
novels and serialized tales; story papers;64 books, theatrical performances and pictures (including 
the classics) that might “arouse in young and inexperienced minds lewd and libidinous thoughts;”65 
illustrated newspapers depicting crimes;66 information about contraception;67 stage plays of “beastly 
character;”68 chewing gum containing prizes;69 and candy lotteries available in confectionery 
stores.70 Comstock did not trust parents to be aware of the pernicious effects of such entertainment, 
or even to realize its proximity to their children. 
Motion pictures especially raised a tumult of efforts at censorship from their inception.71 Some 
major cities even shut down all movie theaters, prompted at least in part by the notion that movies 
were “schools of crime.”72 The Supreme Court initially declined to extend the protection of the First 
Amendment to moving pictures.73 In its 1915 decision in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected an industry claim that movies were “useful, interesting, 
amusing, educational and moral.”74 The Court condemned movies as “capable of evil . . . the greater 
because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition.”75 Following that ruling, nearly one hun-
dred bills intended to censor motion pictures were introduced in the various state legislatures in 
1921 alone. In the next year similar bills came before Congress, until the industry agreed to police 
itself.76 
The Supreme Court did not reverse Mutual Film until 1952.77 In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
the Supreme Court held for the first time that “expression by means of motion pictures is included 
within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”78 The ma-
jority opinion flatly rejected the state’s justification of censorship on the grounds that “motion pic-
tures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other 
modes of expression.”79 
In Burstyn, the Supreme Court enunciated the frequently cited principle that “each method [of 
speech] tends to present its own peculiar problems.”80 In subsequent references to the “peculiar” 
properties of each medium, the Supreme Court has inexplicably neglected the rest of that passage,81 
which underscores that the principles of the Speech Clause transcend any distinctions based on 
mode of expression: “the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First 
Amendment’s command, do not vary. Those principles . . . make freedom of expression the rule.”82
 
But that did not stop public outcries about the emergence of new modes of speech.83 In 1954-55, 
the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary concluded that the “crime and horror” genre of 
comic books which “offer short courses in murder, mayhem, robbery, rape, cannibalism, carnage, 
necrophilia, sex, sadism, masochism, and virtually every other form of crime” read daily by thou-
sands of children was “contributing to the country’s alarming rise in juvenile delinquency.”84 At 
about the same time, courts noted that “the broadening of freedom of expression and of the frank-
ness with which sex and sex relations are dealt with . . . appear in all media of public expression.”85 
The controversies continued in response to the evolution of television, computers, video games, 
and music.86 Cole Porter’s “Love for Sale” may have pushed the envelope in 1930. In the mid-
1960s “Let’s Spend the Night Together” seemed pretty risque.87 More recently, Grammy Award 
winner Alanis Morrisette lamented the loss of her lover to another woman, asking “will she go 
down on you in a theater?”88 and Nine Inch Nails offered the romantic medley “you let me violate 
 you, you let me desecrate you, you let me penetrate you . . . I want to fuck you like an animal . . . 
.”89 
The pace of social change and the emergence of new modes and styles of communication have 
long inspired calls for censorship designed to shield children from contamination, and they continue 
to prompt parental concern. But whether or not such adult concerns are justified, or look reasonable 
in hindsight, the Speech Clause restricts the ability of the body politic to regulate speech that is pro-
tected for adults. Government efforts to make protected speech unavailable to children must over-
come a number of constitutional barriers, beginning with the problem of definition, as explored in 
the following Part. 
III. DEFINITIONS AND PARAMETERS 
In this Article, I refer to “offensive and disagreeable” speech that is nonetheless protected under 
the Speech Clause as “controversial.”90 Controversial speech comprises the combined category of 
“indecent” speech which does not meet the legal definition of obscenity yet may be offensive to 
some recipients, and speech that contains “violent” material, which are the two kinds of content that 
seem most likely to alarm popular sentiment when they reach children.91 Material that may offend 
in other ways, such as speech that might be perceived as blasphemous or racist also falls within the 
rubric of “controversial” speech. Admittedly, the term “controversial” is as vague as the terms “in-
decent,” “patently offensive,” or “violent.” Different observers, in different communities, perhaps 
depending on context, will draw the line at different subjects and at different ways of presenting 
those subjects.92 The lines between unprotected speech and controversial speech are often murky, 
especially since the definition of obscenity93 (which is not protected speech) is far from a model of 
legal precision. As difficult as it has been for courts to define obscenity, protected controversial 
speech is even more amorphous. This Part examines the parameters of controversial speech by clari-
fying the sources of concern, the underlying difficulty of establishing meaningful categories of 
speech, and the range of controversial speech that has been targeted for regulation.94 
Judge Patricia Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit, commenting on the cable indecency 
statute ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court in Denver Area,95 captured the confusion sur-
rounding the legal status of controversial speech: 
 
Lurid descriptions of programming that may well cross over the line into obscenity and 
merit no First Amendment protection at all should not obscure what this case really is 
about. This case is not about obscenity; it concerns significant restrictions on a class of 
speech that is unquestionably entitled to constitutional protection, although possibly of-
fensive to some audiences. Under the broad definition of ‘indecency’ used in this regu-
lation, affected speech could include programs on the AIDS epidemic, abortion, child-
birth, or practically any aspect of human sexuality, as well as much literature and art 
from all over the world.96 
 
No communications are beyond challenge, even the Bible. The Song of Solomon is obscene to 
some people.97 The Bible is replete with stories of adultery, family betrayal, and actions motivated 
by physical passion.98 Some who do not find the Bible obscene may find the stories it contains con-
troversial. 
A. Government Regulation of Constitutionally Unprotected Speech 
 By definition, the protected speech that is my concern here is not legally obscene and is not used 
to facilitate crimes against children. Both obscenity99 and criminal speech100 are outside the protec-
tion of the First Amendment, and are illegal under a variety of statutes. None of the arguments of-
fered here challenge the Supreme Court’s holding in New York v. Ferber that “prevention of sexual 
exploitation and abuse” of minors is “a government objective of surpassing importance.”101 In con-
trast to the speech under consideration here, Ferber upheld a law intended to stop the use and ex-
ploitation of actual children in the production of child pornography.102 
Obscenity (or what is generally called hard-core pornography) lies outside the protection of the 
First Amendment regardless of the medium of communication.103 Obscene speech can be, and is, 
regulated for adults and children alike.104 Under the test enunciated in Miller v. California, three 
elements must coalesce to render a communication legally obscene: 
 
(a) . . . ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) . . . the work de-
picts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 
the applicable state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political or scientific value.105 
 
As discussed further below, controversial speech often has “serious literary, artistic, political or sci-
entific value” which prevents the speech from falling within the legal definition of obscenity.106 
The three elements of the Miller test may be modified when applied to minors, so that the im-
pact of the speech and its value may differ depending on whether or not the recipient is an adult. In 
Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court upheld a variable definition of obscenity for minors con-
tained in a state statute barring the sale to minors of non-obscene “girlie” magazines that were pro-
tected speech for consenting adults.107 It is frequently assumed that Ginsberg provides a rationale 
for regulating protected speech, but in fact Ginsberg only lowered the bar for obscenity as applied 
to minors.108 The statute at issue adapted the then-governing test for obscenity (the Roth-Memoirs 
test)109 to weigh community standards as to “what is suitable material for minors.”110 The act further 
“adjusted the definition of obscenity ‘to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of ma-
terial to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests’ of such minors.”111 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Ginsberg was premised on the assumption that the material 
which the statute suppressed for those under the age of seventeen was in fact “obscene” as to minors 
(though not as to adults, under the concept of “variable obscenity”), and therefore that the speech 
was outside the protection of the First Amendment.112 This is a critical distinction from the pro-
tected controversial matter with which this Article is concerned, for it determined the level of scru-
tiny the Court applied to the “girlie” magazine statute at issue in Ginsberg. The majority opinion 
made explicit that since the magazines were unprotected as to minors under the Speech Clause, the 
only question for the Court was “whether the New York Legislature might rationally conclude . . . 
that exposure to the materials proscribed . . . constitutes such an ‘abuse.’“113 Once the Court ac-
cepted the legislature’s finding that the material was obscene for minors, it logically followed that 
the law would receive only the rational basis scrutiny that applies to statutes which do not implicate 
constitutional liberties. Applying that deferential standard, the Court concluded “it is not irrational 
for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to mi-
nors.”114 
 Many of the doctrinal problems surrounding controversial speech and children stem from the 
failure to confront the significance of the fact that Ginsberg does not stand for the principle that the 
state has a “compelling interest” in regulating protected speech that reaches minors. Nor does any 
language in the majority opinion suggest that the Supreme Court would have found a higher stan-
dard than mere rationality to have been satisfied on the facts. Justice Brennan pointed out that there 
was no dearth of studies contradicting the legislative finding that reading such magazines was inju-
rious to the development of young people.115 But, he observed, in applying rational basis analysis, 
“we do not demand of legislatures ‘scientifically certain criteria.’“116 To the contrary, in order to 
support a regulation of speech that does not infringe on constitutional rights, such as the speech at 
issue in Ginsberg, the state must only provide “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could 
provide a rational basis” for its action.117 
If “scientifically certain criteria” remain unnecessary when the government attempts to demon-
strate a compelling interest as opposed to a rational basis for legislation, at least some level of certi-
tude may be required before courts are asked to approve infringement of core liberty interests. The 
government’s burden to demonstrate a “compelling interest” requires something more than a mere 
showing that the government regulation is not irrational.118 If material does not fall within the defi-
nition of variable obscenity applicable to minors, then the state may not prevent minors from receiv-
ing the speech. Speech that is not obscene for minors is protected from state regulation for minors 
as well as for adults.119 
B. Controversial Speech and the Problem of Meaningful Definitions 
While the Supreme Court has never succeeded in defining obscenity with clarity, it has never 
even attempted to define indecent or violent speech.120 The speech subjected to regulation in order 
to protect children is often characterized as arguably “indecent,” a term which has no legal defini-
tion.121 A Congressional attempt to expand the margins of indecency--however defined--lay at the 
heart of ACLU I, in which the Supreme Court held that two statutory provisions enacted “to protect 
minors from ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ communications on the Internet” violated the First 
Amendment.122 The portions of the statute at issue in ACLU I, the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”), effectively barred both indecent and patently offensive speech from the Internet, but did 
not define either term.123 Significantly, the CDA did not provide any exceptions for content with 
“serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value” even in an educational context,124 including 
serious communications between parents and their own children. The CDA imposed criminal penal-
ties both on speakers who knew that their communications would reach minors and on those who 
merely displayed messages on the Internet in a manner that would be accessible to minors. The lat-
ter behavior included all materials posted on unrestricted web pages or contributions to chat rooms 
that a minor might enter in the midst of a dialogue. Because of the lack of a scienter requirement, 
the breadth of the speech affected and the lack of a defense based on the inherent value of the 
speech, the CDA effectively squelched virtually all speech about sex and bodily functions on the 
Internet. It barred adult speakers and recipients as well as minors from engaging in such speech. 
Whatever the precise definitions, however elusive they may be, Justice Scalia has correctly 
noted the irony that as society becomes more tolerant of a variety of speech--removing it from the 
category of “obscenity” which may be subject to regulation--the result is that a higher proportion of 
speech that offends many citizens falls into the even amorphous category of “indecent.”125 The con-
traction of the scope of unprotected speech related to sex and the resulting expansion of the universe 
of protected “indecent” speech makes the intractable problem of definitions both more difficult and 
 more important. “Where a reasonable person draws the line in this balancing process--that is, how 
few children render the risk unacceptable--depends in part on what mere ‘indecency’ (as opposed to 
‘obscenity’) includes,” Justice Scalia observed, focusing on speech that falls at the margins.126 “The 
more narrow the understanding of what is ‘obscene’ and hence the more pornographic what is em-
braced within the residual category of ‘indecency,’ the more reasonable it becomes to insist upon 
greater assurance of insulation from minors,” he concluded.127 To justify restrictions on speech, 
however, the government--unlike parents--must have an interest that is more than “reasonable.”128 
The Supreme Court has never squarely confronted the question of whether speech that is “inde-
cent” (however defined) is entitled to lesser constitutional protection than other forms of protected 
speech.129 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, however, that indecent speech falls 
within the rubric of protected speech, and that the government may not make such speech inacces-
sible to adults.130 According to Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion in Pacifica: 
 
The concept of ‘indecent’ is intimately connected with children to language that de-
scribes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards 
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs at times of day 
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.131 
 
Pacifica represents the epitome of the FCC’s gradual expansion of the concept of indecency since 
the 1920s from “an amorphous generalization poorly differentiated from obscenity into a concept 
‘intimately connected with the exposure of children to’“ controversial material.132 
The treatment of violent speech is distinguishable from the speech considered in Pacifica which 
involved sexuality and bodily functions. Although there is widespread concern about the amount of 
violence contained in entertainment that reaches children,133 the Supreme Court has never held that 
speech containing violent sentiments or imagery lies outside the protection of the First Amendment 
as applied to either adults or children.134 The sole exceptions are speech that fits the definition of 
“fighting words” or rises to the level of “incitement,” neither of which applies for the purposes of 
the analysis here.135 Controversial speech about violence merely portrays violent acts or characters 
but does not expressly advocate imminent violence. It is no easier to define than speech dealing 
with sexuality. As early as 1972, the FCC concluded that it could not prohibit broadcast violence 
because the subject matter would prove impossible to define.136 And violence has not become any 
easier to define with the passage of time. As one Congressman recently wondered, does violence 
mean “a movie like ‘Home Alone,’ . . . a movie like ‘Ben Hur,’ . . . [or] a movie like ‘[Saving] Pri-
vate Ryan’?”137 
As difficult as it has been to develop a legal definition of obscenity, and as elusive as the effort 
to pin down violent speech has proven, protected controversial speech is even more resistant to pre-
cise definition.138 Controversial speech falls along a spectrum, so that some speech may fall just on 
the legal side of obscenity, saved by some small measure of “literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value,” while other controversial speech is clearly far from obscene but offensive to some sensibili-
ties. Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, after all, defied their families, engaged in ardent teenage sex, 
and committed suicide. 
The third prong of the Miller test (the “value” prong) saves a substantial portion of speech from 
being labeled obscene even as to minors. The CDA would have impermissibly barred Internet 
communications about birth control practices, safe sex, the consequences of prison rape, each of the 
 seven dirty words at issue in Pacifica, classic artworks depicting nudes, and arguably the card cata-
logues of major libraries, each of which has value under Miller.139 
The subjectivity which Justices as different as Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan have correctly 
attributed to the Miller test has become a matter of legal concern because of the “lack of an ascer-
tainable standard” with which to measure value.140 As one Congressman put it, “where one Mem-
ber’s aversions end, others with different sensibilities and with different values begin.”141 Justice 
Scalia, who concurred in a case holding that the third prong of Miller contemplates requiring jurors 
to assess the saving value of speech according to a reasonable person standard,142 protested that ask-
ing jurors to make such a judgment as “reasonable” people was “quite impossible . . . there being 
many accomplished people who have found literature in Dada, and art in the replication of a soup 
can.”143 Such decisionmaking, if not always impossible, he continued, “is at least impossible in the 
cases that matter.”144 
Justice Scalia concluded that “we would be better advised to adopt as a legal maxim what has 
long been the wisdom of mankind: De gustibus non est disputandum. Just as there is no use arguing 
about taste, there is no use litigating about it.”145 In what may seem to be a tautology, but is a build-
ing block of First Amendment jurisprudence, if the speech is not obscene (and does not fall within 
limited other First Amendment exceptions), it is protected under the Speech Clause.146 
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST 
The failure to achieve specificity in articulating the kinds of speech the state seeks to regulate 
has complicated judicial efforts to scrutinize the government’s alleged interests. And yet, that is 
precisely what the applicable legal standard requires the courts to do. 
A. The Applicable Legal Standard 
The Supreme Court has expressly required judges to ask whether the record supports a finding 
that the governmental interest asserted reaches the constitutional dimension required by the applica-
ble First Amendment test. Except in the rarest circumstances, the test applied to regulations on con-
troversial speech will be strict scrutiny because the regulations are content-based.147 Strict scrutiny 
requires courts to balance the individual liberty interests affected against the government’s pro-
claimed interest.148 
The Speech Clause occupies a special place in constitutional jurisprudence because it lies at the 
core of three foundational principles of our system of governance: the marketplace of ideas, self-
determination, and personal autonomy.149 The marketplace of ideas primarily captures the notion 
that “good” speech will overcome “bad,” so that “truth” will prevail. The marketplace is a prerequi-
site for creating an informed populace capable of governing itself through democratic self-
determination.150 Both of these interrelated utilitarian values are closely linked to the third goal of 
personal autonomy. As Justice Brandeis explained, the Founding Fathers believed that “the final 
end of the state was to make men free to develop their facilities, and that in its government the de-
liberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a 
means.”151 All three values are at stake when the state abridges speech even for the popular goal of 
shielding children.152 
Constitutional jurisprudence imposes a heavy burden on the state when regulating expression.153 
According to First Amendment doctrine, courts may not even evaluate whether a given regulation is 
narrowly tailored until the state establishes its compelling interest. The state must both articulate 
 and demonstrate a compelling interest based on a real harm in order to justify any government regu-
lation on the content of speech. The government must also show two corollaries to shore up its 
claim that the interest is compelling, rather than merely legitimate. First, the government must dem-
onstrate a nexus between the harm the government seeks to diminish and the particular speech af-
fected by the regulation. Second, the state must demonstrate a likelihood that the regulation will 
substantially diminish the harm. 
The Supreme Court has long held that government may not regulate otherwise protected speech 
based on its content without demonstrating a specific nexus between the speech and harm flowing 
to citizens. For example, a state may have a “legitimate interest” in preserving the integrity of the 
electoral process, but that interest is not sufficiently “compelling” to sustain statutory limitations on 
the nature of the promises a candidate may make to the electorate during a campaign.154 Similarly, 
the Supreme Court overturned a statutory limitation on political contributions made by corporations, 
on the grounds that the regulation was “unjustified by a compelling state interest.”155 
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court invalidated a regulation designed to pro-
tect children, because it lacked the “clarity of purpose” essential under the Speech Clause.156 To jus-
tify differential treatment of speech based on content, the State must first show that the regulation 
“is necessary to serve a compelling state interest.”157 The burden is on the government to demon-
strate that it has a compelling interest in regulating speech; the government interest cannot be taken 
for granted.158 As Justice Brandeis warned, “fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression 
of free speech . . . . Men feared witches and burnt women . . . . To justify suppression of free speech 
there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.”159 
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the case that accorded cable television greater pro-
tection than that available to the broadcast media, the Supreme Court clarified its earlier hints about 
the judicial duty to inquire into the government’s compelling interest. Despite fractured opinions on 
the merits in Turner, and the application of intermediate rather than strict scrutiny, the Justices 
unanimously agreed that: 
 
When the government defends a regulation on speech as a means to . . . prevent antici-
pated harms, it must do more than simply ‘posit the existence of the disease sought to 
be cured’ . . . . It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjec-
tural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material 
way.160 
 
One year later, in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, a case that did not re-
quire strict scrutiny because the regulation was content-neutral, the Supreme Court reiterated the 
burden on the government.161 The Supreme Court made explicit that in order to regulate protected 
speech at all, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest, including a nexus between 
the interest it asserts and the actual harm that the regulation can prevent.162 National Treasury Em-
ployees involved a statute banning federal employees from accepting compensation for speeches 
and articles, regardless of subject matter. Because the statute did not discriminate among forms of 
speech based on content, the Court only subjected it to a rational basis review, but one that can be 
understood as a “heightened reasonableness” test.163 Even in this context, the majority imposed the 
burden on the state to establish a compelling interest which it had spelled out in Turner.164 
 Under the Turner test, it is not sufficient for the government to assert an abstract or generalized 
interest in children’s development to sustain a regulation on speech. In order to meet its burden to 
show a compelling interest in regulating speech to shield the young, the state would have to demon-
strate: (i) that children’s social, moral or emotional development is at stake; (ii) that the speech is 
the direct cause of the risk; and (iii) that restricting the speech will in fact reduce the risk of harm. 
This means that after the government establishes that controversial speech jeopardizes children, it 
must also show that the regulation will effectively minimize the risks. 
Balancing involves more than a declaration that one set of interests is more important than an-
other. It requires the court to identify the interests on both sides, value them, and compare them.165 
In order for a court to assess value, the government may need to provide empirical data about such 
issues as the extent and seriousness of the problem which the government seeks to resolve by im-
pinging on a constitutional right, on the one hand, and whether the regulation is likely to resolve the 
problem efficiently enough that the trade-offs are justifiable, on the other. 
Despite the clear instructions set forth in Turner, courts at all levels regularly fail to explore 
whether the government has demonstrated the components of a compelling interest. The formal ju-
dicial inquiry under the Speech Clause normally skips the required threshold inquiry into the com-
pelling interest alleged by the government and focuses instead on just two of the three critical ques-
tions that courts must weigh in analyzing abridgements of speech: (i) the nature of the constitutional 
liberty interests at stake;166 and (ii) whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the gov-
ernment interest without undue burden on speech.167 
B. The Supreme Court Cases 
Although the government regularly cites Pacifica for the proposition that a compelling interest 
in shielding children from indecency justifies at least some forms of regulation,168 the facts in 
Pacifica would not satisfy the standards subsequently spelled out in Turner.169 In Pacifica, the Su-
preme Court upheld FCC enforcement proceedings that followed from an afternoon radio broadcast 
of satirist George Carlin’s monologue about seven dirty words that must never be said on broadcast 
media. Justice Stevens’ opinion for the plurality took the government’s interest for granted in that 
context.170 None of the four opinions issued offered any explicit discussion of whether an independ-
ent government interest in protecting children exists, much less whether the government had estab-
lished a convincing nexus between the regulated speech and the anticipated harm.171 
Even in the most recent Supreme Court cases involving regulation of speech to protect children, 
the government has not seriously attempted to establish that the controversial speech it sought to 
regulate is a cause of real harm. Nor has the Supreme Court raised Turner as a hurdle that the gov-
ernment must clear, despite the test it had set forth. This judicial deficit is emphatically present in 
the trilogy of cases involving speech deemed harmful to children with which this Article began: 
ACLU I, Sable, and Denver Area. 
In ACLU I, the Supreme Court entirely failed to analyze the governmental interest in protecting 
children from indecency on the Internet. Instead, it summarily noted the “legitimacy and importance 
of the congressional goal.”172 Under First Amendment analysis, a merely “legitimate” or “impor-
tant” interest normally would not withstand even intermediate scrutiny, much less the strict scrutiny 
imposed where the government interferes with protected speech based on its content.173 
In Sable, despite the Supreme Court’s earlier pronouncements on the importance of scrutinizing 
the interests set forth by the government, the majority summarily concluded that the Court has “rec-
 ognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being 
of minors.”174 To reach this sweeping conclusion, the Supreme Court accepted the government’s 
reliance on Ginsberg and Ferber.175 Neither Ginsberg nor Ferber, however, were decided under a 
strict scrutiny analysis, and therefore neither establishes a “compelling interest” for purposes of 
regulating protected speech in any context.176 
In Denver Area, the Justices paid slightly more attention to the government’s asserted interest, 
but were inconsistent in labeling the nature of that interest. Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion notes 
at the outset that the government has a “basic, legitimate objective of protecting children from ex-
posure to ‘patently offensive’ materials.”177 Subsequently, in a portion of the plurality opinion 
joined by only three Justices, Justice Breyer changed the label applied to the government interest 
from “legitimate” to “compelling,” in the context of analyzing why a total ban on protected speech 
violates the First Amendment, regardless of the strength of the government’s interest.178 In Denver 
Area, the Supreme Court held that while Congress could permit a cable operator to decide whether 
to allow broadcast of indecent material on leased access channels, it could not require cable opera-
tors to segregate and block such programming. Nor could Congress allow cable operators to prevent 
rare or nonexistent ‘patently offensive’ programming on public, educational, and government chan-
nels (“PEGs”) since it had not proven that a social problem even existed on channels reserved for 
use by public and nonprofit organizations.179 
The incoherent discussion of the government’s interest in Denver Area was extraordinary be-
cause it violated every requirement the Supreme Court itself had imposed under Turner. The Jus-
tices jumped from labeling the state interest “basic” or “legitimate” to calling it “compelling” and, 
in the next breath, concluded that at least one part of the legislation was not even “necessary.” Not a 
single opinion asked how a statute that is not “necessary” could serve a compelling state interest. If 
it had applied Turner, the Supreme Court should have concluded that to the extent the government 
failed to demonstrate that the harms it alleged were real, it had no compelling interest in regulating 
controversial material.180 
Where protection of children is invoked as an interest, cogent legal analysis too often is deemed 
gratuitous. Many factors contribute to this analytic looseness. These factors include an emotional 
response to children’s vulnerability, an irrational sense that if a law is designed to protect children, 
then it must be good,and the often unquestioned legal principle that while children may have rights, 
the rights accorded to them are not co-extensive with the rights of adults.181 The operative presump-
tion of the latter principle, which is too often inverted, is that children do indeed possess some ver-
sion of constitutional rights. Those rights include the right to receive speech and the right to speak. 
The Supreme Court has never defined the precise parameters of children’s constitutional rights, 
whether under the Speech Clause or more broadly,182 but the Supreme Court has sometimes mini-
mized those rights by indicating that the state may regulate the conduct of minors beyond what 
would be constitutional if applied to adults.183 It is not necessary to resolve the debate surrounding 
the scope of children’s speech rights with regard to limitations imposed by the state in this context, 
because constitutional liberties are not operative between children and their parents.184 The central 
issue here is whether the state has a compelling interest in limiting speech that some parents may 
wish their own children to receive. 
Whatever the respective merits and defects of presumptions about rights that flow directly to 
minors, the frequent diminution of rights exercised by young citizens should raise warning flags 
when used to justify regulations on speech that affect adults as well as children, which was the case 
 with the statutes at issue in ACLU I, Sable, and Denver Area. It may well be that the statutes under 
review in ACLU I and Sable--and, more indirectly, in Denver Area--were so transparently unconsti-
tutional in the scope of their ban on speech that the Justices realized at first glance that the regula-
tions before them would not survive scrutiny. Under such circumstances, not confronted with a 
close case, perhaps the Supreme Court deemed it less pressing to analyze the state’s compelling in-
terest. This approach carries grave consequences. First, it promotes undisciplined thinking about the 
nature of the government’s interest, which may affect the future actions of legislators and regula-
tors. Second, it suggests to judges sitting on the lower courts that they too can skip the required in-
quiry into the state’s compelling interest. Finally, the implicit promise of judicial deference invites 
legislators and advocates of censorship to abridge speech with relative abandon. 
It may seem that assessment of the weightiness of the state’s interest is largely subjective.185 
The standard is not, however, entirely subjective because it places a burden on the government to 
demonstrate the existence of a specified harm that can be successfully addressed by regulation--a 
minimal requirement that the government has frequently failed to meet when it relies on “the salu-
tary purpose of protecting children.”186 A finding that the state’s interest in regulating speech to pro-
tect children does not constitute a sufficiently “compelling interest” to justify the regulation of pro-
tected speech does “not belittle the state’s interest in the well-being of minors.”187 The interest 
might still be sufficient to satisfy a rational basis test, as in Ginsberg.188 It would also justify nu-
merous government programs designed to help children and families that do not impinge on speech 
rights or other foundational constitutional liberties. 
C. The Specter of Censorship 
The incoherence of the judiciary invites efforts to constrain freedom of expression. As Justice 
Kennedy has argued, raw censorship based on content renders any government regulation of speech 
unconstitutional unless it reaches only the narrowly defined types of speech that fall outside the pro-
tection of the First Amendment.189 He fears that the Court’s willingness even to examine the pro-
posed compelling interest behind a regulation “might be read as a concession that States may censor 
speech whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for doing so.”190 To be sure, the 
passivity of most courts--including the Supreme Court--in accepting the interest the government 
alleges in protecting children suggests that this concern may be well-founded. 
If Justice Kennedy’s view prevailed, it would be unnecessary to explore the depth, precision or 
legitimacy of the state’s alleged compelling interests in regulating speech to protect children. But as 
long as strict scrutiny, beginning with analysis of the compelling interest asserted, remains the mode 
of analyzing infringements on protected speech, courts should perform the serious inquiry urged 
here where the government claims to be motivated by a desire to protect children. 
1. Looking at Motives 
Strict scrutiny does not permit courts to wear blinders regarding the intent of those who would 
curtail speech.191 In the major cases involving restrictions on controversial speech to protect chil-
dren, intent to chill the speech more generally has not been a close question, as courts have noted 
repeatedly. The Supreme Court has been unequivocal in stating that to withstand scrutiny, the com-
pelling interest alleged by the government must be the “actual purpose,” not just one that seems 
convincing.192 
In ACLU I, the majority of the Justices expressly labeled the CDA a transparent attempt at “cen-
sorship,”193 and with good cause. Senator James Exon, one of the drafters of the CDA, presented the 
 Senate with a compendium of lurid materials available on the Internet that, in his view, threatened 
to turn every computer into a “red light district.”194 He lamented the littering of “this information 
superhighway with obscene [and] indecent . . . pornography . . . . Virtual but virtueless reality is 
projected in the most twisted, sick use of sexuality.”195 
So too, Senator Joseph Lieberman, praising a separate title in the statute that contained the CDA 
which required that television manufacturers install a “V-chip” allowing parents to block receipt of 
certain categories of programs, proclaimed that the problem is not “rating the garbage” but how to 
“get rid of the garbage.”196 Supporters of the statute overturned in Denver Area stated on the floor 
of Congress that controversial cable programming “should be stopped, must be stopped.”197 The 
purpose of the legislation, they continued, was “to put an end to the kind of things going on” on ca-
ble channels.198 
While neither a considered nor a cavalier attitude toward enactment by the legislators is disposi-
tive,199 federal courts have noted with dismay the cavalier process commonly accorded government 
regulations on speech once the goal of protecting children is invoked. The frequent lack of serious 
consideration to restrictions on speech adopted in the name of protecting children flies in the face of 
the Supreme Court’s proclamation that the “essence” of the Speech Clause is “that Congress may 
not regulate speech except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care 
that we have not elsewhere required.”200 
In ACLU I, for example, the Supreme Court detailed the lack of legislative attention paid to the 
CDA’s key provisions by legislators. In contrast to the other six Titles of the statute in which the 
CDA was embedded, each of which, Justice Stevens noted, was “the product of extensive commit-
tee hearings and the subject of discussion in Reports prepared by the Committees of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives,” in enacting the CDA, he underscored, “the Senate went in willy-
nilly, passed legislation, and never once had a hearing, never once had a discussion other than an 
hour or so on the floor.”201 Further, Justice Stevens drew an express and disapproving parallel be-
tween the legislative process that resulted in the CDA and the haphazard process that resulted in the 
statute regarding telephone indecency at issue in Sable.202 Sable was perhaps even more troubling, 
because the legislation at issue in the case emerged following a decade in which Congress and the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) attempted end-runs around decisions by the lower 
courts invalidating their efforts to eliminate commercial telephone sex.203 
The government has repeatedly failed to exercise even a modest degree of care in enacting 
measures that limit protected speech with the asserted purpose of protecting children, much less to 
demonstrate the special sensitivity required under the Speech Clause. The record indicates that leg-
islators have used children as a transparent excuse for broad censorship on more than one occasion. 
The lapses in sensitivity to speech rights when children are involved, noted by the Supreme Court, 
make it even more imperative to analyze the interests asserted by the government as Turner re-
quires. To sustain its purported interest, the state must demonstrate that a compelling state interest 
exists sufficient to justify regulation of protected speech by showing that the targeted speech places 
children’s development at risk, that the speech causes the identified harm, and that restrictions on 
speech will reduce the risk of harm to children. Parts V and VI turn to this analysis. 
V. EMPOWERING PARENTS AS A GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST 
Although the courts have not demanded that the proponents of regulation articulate the compel-
ling interests they seek to promote, the government has offered two plausible compelling interests 
 which merit serious consideration. First, the state asserts an interest in reinforcing parental author-
ity, which is the focus of this Part. Second, the state posits an independent interest in shielding chil-
dren from speech that could harm them, examined in Part VI.204 
The government’s strongest argument in support of a compelling interest in regulating speech to 
shield minors is the claim that the state acts to reinforce parental decisionmaking and to help parents 
enforce their personal choices about what their children are ready to read, see, or hear.205 It com-
ports with longstanding obiter dicta that parents and guardians are entrusted with the care and up-
bringing of children.206 When regulations on protected speech impinge on the zone of family pri-
vacy, two foundational rights collide, creating an even more urgent demand that the government 
interest be clearly articulated and pursued with the greatest sensitivity. Government discrimination 
among types of speech based on its assessment of whether the speech is suitable for minors, as-
sumes a harmony of value preferences among parents within a pluralistic society. Because of the 
range of views among parents, it may ultimately prove impossible for the government to regulate 
speech with the goal of reinforcing the exercise of every parent’s autonomous authority. 
A. The Principle of Family Autonomy 
Personal autonomy is part of the essence of the First Amendment.207 Applied to families and 
children considered as one unit, the general principle of autonomy is reinforced by the Supreme 
Court’s longstanding obiter dicta that “it is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents.”208 In its 1923 decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, upholding the right of 
parents to seek instruction in the German language for their children, the Supreme Court expressly 
rejected communal models of child rearing where “no parent is to know his own child, nor any child 
his parent,” as well as the model of ancient Sparta where the state trained children over age seven in 
barracks in “order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens.”209 No matter how many 
men of genius might support such modes of child rearing, the Court stated, “their ideas touching the 
relation between individual and State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions 
rest.”210 Any effort to impose such restrictions on parental choice would do “violence to both letter 
and spirit of the Constitution.”211 
The state’s claim of an interest in reinforcing family authority flounders in the face of the diver-
sity of values among families in a pluralist society.212 The interests of the state and of individual 
parents often conflict in the sensitive areas protected by the First Amendment. The notion that fami-
lies may differ about the values they wish to transmit to their children has received longstanding 
deference from the courts.213 Parents have a recognized liberty interest in raising their children as 
they see fit, so long as they do not cross the line to jeopardize their children’s safety.214 
For heuristic purposes we can divide families into three categories that reflect the complex rela-
tionships among government actors, mainstream mores, and each family’s values. First, in an “ide-
alized normative family,” the parents share the moral values of the government actors as well as 
sharing the same understanding of how to best transmit those values to the next generation, and the 
children are on the low end of the spectrum of enterprise and disobedience. Second, the “imperfect 
normative family,” the parents are assumed to share the general moral preferences of the govern-
ment actors, but fail, through lack of information, fatigue and over extension, or under performance 
of the parental role to protect their children, and/or the children fall higher on the bell curve for 
traits of enterprise and disobedience in seeking out controversial speech. Third, countless varieties 
of the “nonconformist” family exist, in which the parents do not share the view of the dominant cul-
ture and lawmakers regarding the definition of controversial speech. Such families differ from both 
 kinds of normative families in how they wish to handle children’s exposure to controversial speech 
and in how they view the impact of such speech on their children. The children of nonconformist 
parents may either share family norms or push parental limits through enterprise and disobedience, 
even when those limits are relatively porous.215 Nonconformist families themselves will fall on both 
extremes of a bell curve of attitudes toward various issues involving controversial speech. 
For the regulatory interest in reinforcing parental authority to survive scrutiny, the regulations 
would need to accommodate parental preferences in all three types of families, including the non-
conformist family. In Turner, the Supreme Court underscored that”our political system and cultural 
life rest upon the ideal” of individual choice regarding ideas and expression.216 “Government action 
that stifles speech on account of its message,” the Supreme Court explained, “contravenes this es-
sential right. Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a le-
gitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public 
debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”217 
Parents in all three types of families presumably do not want the government to substitute its 
judgment for theirs.218 Nonetheless, the nonconformist family in particular consists of exactly the 
sort of individuals that the Supreme Court had in mind when it observed that, as a society, we can-
not achieve “intellectual individualism” and “rich cultural diversities” unless we tolerate the risk of 
“occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes.”219 The Court stated that “freedom to differ is not 
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its 
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.”220 
In sum, two sets of constitutional values are at stake. The whole notion of “controversial” 
speech “requires discrimination on the basis of conformity with mainstream mores,”221 an undertak-
ing that is incompatible with the premises of the First Amendment. Despite the popularity of the fig 
leaf provided by the state’s asserted compelling interest in children, whether under the guise of rein-
forcing parental preferences or not, it remains necessary to “carefully scrutinize[]” the justifications 
the state offers for content-based distinctions on controversial speech.222 In addition, parental value 
choices, including those about what speech their children should be able to hear, have been recog-
nized as having constitutional dimensions.223 
B. Empowering ParentsDemystified 
The state relies heavily on the image of protecting children within the family unit by empower-
ing parents to enforce the rules they impose on their children.224 The Supreme Court has deferred to 
the “importance of the parental role in child rearing.”225 The Constitution also demands “that consti-
tutional principles be applied with sensitivity . . . to the special needs of parents and children.”226 If, 
in fact, regulations on speech would empower the idealized normative family, the imperfect norma-
tive family, and the nonconformist family, then a compelling state interest might exist.227 
But this is not the case. Scrutiny of the various arguments put forth in support of the notion that 
state regulations on speech actually empower any family reveals that regulations on speech adopted 
to protect children in fact threaten to undermine parental authority instead of reinforcing it.228 
1. Parental Discretion 
When the state makes controversial material entirely unavailable, it preempts crucial parental 
discretion about what children can see or do.229 The presumption of family autonomy suggests that 
such choices should normally be based on the family’s preferences, which might well take into ac-
 count the individual minor’s level of maturity and responsibility.230 As adult citizens, the parents 
have a First Amendment right to receive speech that is controversial but not obscene. The right to 
receive information is a corollary of the right to speak.231 All adults have the right to engage in con-
troversial speech, whether as speakers or as recipients of speech they wish to hear. In addition, par-
ents have a constitutionally protected interest in their ability to digest and pass on information to 
their children, regardless of community norms.232 That right is protected for parents in three ways: 
(i) through the right to receive information under the Speech Clause; (ii) as a speaker communicat-
ing information and ideas; and (iii) by the right of family privacy. 
In the area of sexuality, for example, the Supreme Court has recognized that parents may need 
concrete information about sex, birth control, and sexually transmitted diseases to help them com-
municate with their adolescent offspring.233 The fundamental rights of parents protect a parent’s de-
cision to provide a teenager with information about sex and related topics, even if the rest of the 
community were to condemn such openness as violating the community’s norms of appropriate-
ness.234 The Ginsberg decision, sustaining regulation of the sale of girlie magazines that were un-
protected speech for minors, rested in part on the understanding that parents who “may wish their 
children to have uninhibited access” to such literature could still legally purchase the material for 
their children.235 Purchasing a magazine at a newsstand or convenience store is much less burden-
some than circumventing bans and safe harbors by using “subscription and pay-per-view cable 
channels, delayed-access viewing using VCR equipment, and the rental or purchase of . . . audio 
and video cassettes.”236 Where the government places obstacles in the way of those who wish to ob-
tain controversial speech, but does not ban the speech, it inhibits both individual adult recipients and 
adults acting in their parental role who might wish to allow their children to receive such speech or 
to use that speech to communicate with their children.237 If the material remains available but hard 
to obtain,238 government regulations would burden a parent’s ability to share controversial speech 
with an adolescent child.239 
Although courts may assume that the “vast majority” of parents agree with the choices made by 
government regulators,240 and that those parents welcome intervention, many parents might wish to 
allow their children access to controversial material. Not every parent will agree about what mate-
rial is controversial, much less what material may be harmful to the young. Adults within the same 
family may not always agree about such matters.241 Each set of parents may differ depending on 
which child is asking to see the controversial material. Issues such as the minor’s age, maturity, and 
judgment will all enter into parental decisions.242 
Some parents may decide to “view or listen to material with their children, either to criticize, 
endorse, or remain neutral about what they see or hear.”243 For example, a parent may watch a ra-
cially insensitive or derogatory movie with an older child in order to help the child learn “to think 
critically about offensive ideas.”244 Such a parent might believe that the shared experience and dis-
cussion would help the child to respond more effectively to racially disparaging speech heard out-
side the home, in keeping with the family’s non-racist values.245 The same might hold true of dis-
cussions of violence, sex, and other controversial topics. Parents who choose such an approach may 
be dismissed by legislators and courts as having poor judgment,246 or condemned as those “who 
wish to expose their children to the most graphic depictions of sexual acts.”247 
The Speech Clause protects the decisions that each person makes about whether to obtain and 
what to make of such controversial speech. First Amendment doctrine is clear: individual choice 
about ideas is the keystone of “our political system and cultural life.”248 It is inconceivable that 
 when a person selects speech in a parental capacity he or she sacrifices the right to choose among 
ideas. The “heart of the First Amendment” protects the freedom of each person, including each par-
ent, to “decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and 
adherence”249 or condemnation. To be sure, it is not always easy to live up to these ideals.250 But it 
is important to do so, even if the vast majority of parents were to demand that they wanted contro-
versial speech blocked.251 
The heterogeneity among nonconformist families further undermines the notion that the state 
can reinforce the choices of all parents by regulating speech. The category of nonconformist fami-
lies includes families that strive to shelter their children from virtually all modern, secular speech.252 
Those families pose special regulatory dilemmas.253 They frequently feel that their essential values 
are endangered by exposure to subjective belief systems which propose that there may not be one 
objective source of truth, and by other secularizing influences.254 Such families often attempt to 
enlist the state as an ally, seeking accommodation in public schools to limit their children’s expo-
sure to such topics as sex education and evolution, as well as to many types of literature.255 
Such particularist families expand the boundaries of robust debate. But the state cannot fully ac-
commodate the preferences of the subgroup of nonconformist parents who want to eliminate speech 
for the children of their fellow citizens as well as for their own children. The litigation record makes 
clear that such parents have frequently asked the state to engage in radical censorship in order to 
help enforce their own views.256 Once again, the notion that regulation of speech reinforces parental 
authority confronts disparities, not just among three types of families ranging from the idealized 
normative to the nonconformist, but among nonconformist families themselves. Some want their 
children to hear everything, others virtually nothing. These disparities make it nearly impossible for 
the government to establish criteria that will not favor one family to the detriment of others. 
Protecting listeners by banning controversial speech altogether is incompatible with the First 
Amendment.257 The Supreme Court has consistently held that “the fact that society may find speech 
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.”258 To the contrary, protection of unpopular 
speech is the essence of the First Amendment.259 As the Supreme Court forcefully reminded readers 
in Texas v. Johnson, “if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.”260 
Banning speech with the goal of reinforcing parental preferences is the height of irony. Bans 
deprive parents of the opportunity to make their own decisions. As Chief Judge Edwards of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has forcefully written, such a regulation “does nothing to facilitate parents’ 
supervision of their children, unless we assume that all parents’ views are not only identical to each 
other, but also the same as the Government’s. This assumption is preposterous . . . .”261 
The assumption in its least benign form is worse than “preposterous.” Once the state regulates 
communications in order to protect children from the “harm” such communications would allegedly 
inflict, it is but a short step to label parents who disagree with majoritarian views and the govern-
ment’s content choices as inadequate in their role as parents. The potential scope of child neglect 
laws is broad, and the interpretation is open to subjective judgments. Child neglect statutes fre-
quently have been used in an effort to legitimize government intervention in culturally nonconform-
ist families.262 
 Although there does not seem to be any reported case in which exposure to speech, without 
more, led to a neglect prosecution, the federal government has publicly contemplated this patently 
absurd result under legislation designed to shield children from speech. At oral argument in ACLU 
I, the Solicitor General conceded that, since the CDA lacked any exception for parents who allowed 
their children to obtain “indecent” speech over the Internet--including information about birth con-
trol or AIDS--there could be “instances in which permitting access actually might constitute child 
abuse.”263 As one of the Justices correctly noted in response, that would be “interfering with the re-
lationship between parent and child.”264 Government labeling of “preferred” speech and “harmful” 
speech for children is not only incompatible with the dictates of the First Amendment, it under-
mines the very families it claims to reinforce. 
2. Aspersions on the Adequacy of Parental Supervision 
Efforts to bar controversial speech or to make it hard to obtain in the name of helping parents 
present yet another irony: they tacitly discount the capacity of parents in all types of families to 
raise their children without the government’s intervention. Limitations on speech suggest that nei-
ther the idealized normative family nor the imperfect normative family is equal to the job of enforc-
ing the values that they share with the regulators. Lower courts have said as much. In the context of 
a safe harbor requirement for radio broadcasts, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reasoned that it did not suffice to limit controversial broadcasts to the hours when parents are at 
work and therefore entirely unavailable to “supervise what their children see and hear.”265 Parents 
apparently could not be counted on to have any idea what their children were up to, even when the 
entire family was at home.266 As one of the sponsors of the statute at issue stated, “parental supervi-
sion is not a cure-all.”267 The court agreed, concluding without elaboration, “it is fanciful to believe 
that the vast majority of parents who wish to shield their children from indecent material can effec-
tively do so without meaningful restrictions on the airing of broadcast indecency.”268 
If the government is correct that parents do not provide adequate supervision for children who 
watch broadcast and cable television, listen to music and radio, cruise the Internet, and play video 
games, it may be in part because the parents wittingly choose not to supervise, or do so in a way 
that is too subtle for regulators to understand. In cases involving the channeling of controversial 
speech to off-hours,269 such as ACT III, the government failed to adduce any evidence about 
whether significant numbers of youngsters were exposed to controversial material or whether par-
ents wished to limit what their children heard.270 The logic of supporting parental authority suggests 
that, if the government has any legitimate interest at all in making controversial speech hard to ob-
tain, that interest should be limited to the times when the average parent is at work and therefore 
unable to supervise. But when “the great preponderance of children are subject to parental con-
trol,”271 whether or not they choose to exercise it, no governmental interest in regulating speech ex-
ists that is even legitimate, much less compelling. 
The argument that the job of responsible parenting is impossible even for the best intentioned 
parents at times masks a frontal attack on nonconformist parents, as Justice Brennan recognized 
when he dissented in Pacifica: 
 
As surprising as it may be to individual Members of this Court, some parents may actu-
ally find [the broadcast’s] unabashed attitude toward the seven ‘dirty words’ healthy, 
and deem it desirable to expose their children to the manner in which Mr. Carlin de-
fuses the taboo surrounding the words. Such parents might constitute a minority of the 
 American public, but the absence of great numbers willing to exercise the right to raise 
their children in this fashion does not alter the right’s nature or its existence.272 
 
Sixteen-year-old Filipina bi-sexual Rheana Parrenas and her parents recognized themselves as 
targets of the CDA.273 Rheana contributes to a forum dedicated to people like herself on the Inter-
net. She was concerned that the CDA would criminalize her self-expression, depriving her of an au-
dience and others of the “fundamental idea of not being alone.”274 Her parents fully supported both 
her expressive activities and her participation in the litigation challenging the CDA.275 
The neighbors of nonconformist families and their children’s schoolmates will understand the 
government’s message in the CDA and other statutes as well. Nonconformist parenting appears to 
equal irresponsible parenting, even if it does not rise to the level of abuse that would justify the 
state’s concrete intervention in the family. By means of moral legislation,276 the state intervenes at 
the heart of the family without the due process that would be necessary in a formal investigation of 
abuse.277 
When the state divides speech into favored and disfavored categories on the premise that disfa-
vored speech harms children, it acts on deeply embedded cultural norms. Law and regulation are 
suffused with such cultural norms, frequently masquerading as either scientific findings or analyti-
cally derived legal certainties. The range of cultural norms is critical to the contemporary legal and 
political debate about controversial speech and children, which one commentator has referred to as 
the “problematization of children.”278 
Regulations that impose moral norms on civil behavior implicating personal autonomy can have 
pernicious effects on child rearing. Family autonomy means a right for parents to raise their chil-
dren as they see fit.279 A mother might reasonably conclude that a daughter who would soon be 
leaving for college should not be subjected to many rules at home, because she needs “the opportu-
nity to learn to manage her time and make decisions before going away to college.”280 In other con-
texts, parents have testified that: 
 
Just as part of teaching children about responsible behavior involves setting limits, part 
of that teaching also involves showing them that rules are not rigid, and that reasonable 
exceptions should be made when there is reasonable justification . . . . It usurps our role 
as parents for the government to step in and tell us and our children that we cannot 
make those decisions for ourselves . . . .281 
 
This view of parenting as fostering the emerging autonomy of the young meshes with the legal 
view of the maturation process. “Constitutional rights,” like children, the Supreme Court has held, 
“do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of major-
ity.”282 As Justice Powell explained, the parenting role promotes responsible maturation by an “af-
firmative process” through which parents teach, guide and inspire in a way that is “beyond the com-
petence of impersonal political institutions.”283 Such individualized decisionmaking teaches that 
actions have consequences, and that responsibility is rewarded with freedom.284 These precepts help 
the “children of this diverse and democratic nation . . . to develop habits of responsibility necessary 
for self-governance and to observe not only the formal rules established by government but also the 
informal rules and understandings that undergird civilized society.”285 
 Parental autonomy values are at issue when the state substitutes its own value preferences and 
judgments for parental discretion regarding otherwise legal activities. In the arguably distinguish-
able context of a juvenile curfew,286 a plurality of the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc in 
Hutchins v. District of Columbia suggested that parents’ rights to direct their children’s upbringing 
were limited to life at home and educational activities.287 That plurality’s pinched version of paren-
tal autonomy would impinge upon daily decisions most parents make without thought of govern-
ment intervention. Surely it: 
 
would come as a stunning surprise to countless parents throughout our history who 
have imposed restrictions on their children’s dating habits, driving, movie selections, 
part-time jobs, and places to visit, and who have permitted, paid for, and supported 
their children’s activities, in sports programs, summer camps, tutorial counseling, col-
lege education and scores of other such activities, all arising outside of the family resi-
dence and school classroom.288 
 
The notion of government as decision-maker for children outside the home would trample mi-
nority views. The principle holds even if some parents--or nearly all parents--welcome the govern-
ment’s legal reinforcement of the restrictions that they themselves would impose. The Hutchins plu-
rality’s loose approach to the scope of state authority over children would violate Meyer by making 
the child a virtual creature of the state.289 
C. Parental Preferences and the Private Market 
To the extent that regulating controversial speech facilitates parental decisionmaking, and can-
not be accomplished without government action,290 a compelling interest may exist. Such a hypo-
thetical situation would require balancing the state interest against the speech rights of adults and 
minors as both speakers and recipients. But this possibility raises two additional questions. First, are 
large numbers of parents eager for help in protecting their children from speech? Second, even if 
they are clamoring for help, is state action the only way to provide that help?291 
The measurable actions of parents themselves suggest that the answer to both questions is no. 
Parents facilitate access to controversial speech by providing electronic equipment for their chil-
dren: over ninety-six percent of American households have televisions,292 and more than two-thirds 
of households subscribe to cable service,293 although parents are acutely aware that children watch a 
lot of television.294 Even more telling, about eighty percent of all children have their own radios 
(and among children under age twelve, two-thirds have their own radios), half of them with a head-
phone that prevents others from hearing what they are listening to.295 Approximately 110 million 
Americans of all ages have access to the Internet whether at home, or through school or work; that 
number grows daily.296 This data suggests that parents as an aggregate have concluded that the 
benefits of receiving speech outweigh the risks for their own children. 
Nor are parents rushing to embrace voluntary forms of monitoring compatible with their own 
preferences, as represented by technologies such as Internet filters, cable lockboxes297 and televi-
sion V-chips298 that erect barriers between their children and controversial speech. With the possible 
exception of the somewhat rarified telephone dial-a-porn services,299 in most forms of communica-
tion, as Judge Wald expressed it, “parents would have to be hermits to be unaware through newspa-
pers and even television itself of the debate over sex and violence.”300 After years of growth, im-
proved technology and public debate, only about one-third of American parents with online connec-
 tions in their homes use a commercially available filtering program.301 On the other hand, this is a 
dramatic rise from only two years earlier, when the district court received evidence in ACLU I.302 
The statistical trend suggests that as the market develops more refined filtering mechanisms that are 
responsive to the genuine concerns of parents, families may be more inclined to use them. In con-
trast, a negligible number of cable subscribers have requested the free lockboxes that federal law 
requires cable operators to provide.303 
The potential legal and logistical problems with the voluntary use of filters are outside the scope 
of this inquiry.304 But a brief consideration of filters, rating systems, and responses to sexually ex-
plicit e-mail in terms of the capacity of technology to enhance parental authority underscores that 
constitutionally permissible measures exist to help parents in the private market. When filters and 
ratings provide information that helps parents make decisions, such developments have the potential 
to enhance parental authority.305 Parents need to understand, however, that existing filtering pro-
grams for Internet communications are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.306 Such programs 
almost uniformly block valuable controversial speech, such as all messages concerning homosexu-
ality, as well as sites that include linguistic derivatives of the words “gay” or “sex.”307 One filtering 
system used in some public schools blocks all information on the Gulf War, on the grounds that it is 
too violent, while allowing unfettered access to information about sports teams, including 
hockey.308 Nonetheless, to the extent that mechanisms can facilitate individual choice about which 
speech is received without overbroad blocking of speech the recipients might wish to see, filtering 
appears to be a potentially useful approach for parents.309 
Filters may best enhance parental authority when a variety of ratings systems are available for 
each medium of expression, reflecting a range of tolerance for speech and a diversity of world 
views. Although the sheer volume of speech on the Internet, and even on cable television, makes it 
difficult for raters who are not the producers of the material to keep pace, the system that might 
serve parental autonomy would involve ratings by groups such as religious denominations, and 
secular or political groups that have an articulated view about cultural norms and values. Parents 
consulting such ratings on movies, or programming computer filters in order to impose restrictions 
based on these ratings, would have a context for understanding the basis on which ratings were as-
signed. Parents could also test different rating systems to find the ones that most closely approxi-
mate the decisions they would make themselves. Those issues, however, concern the “means” side 
of the speech equation, rather than the government interest or “ends” side, which is the focus here. 
Finally, many parents worry about the risks they perceive to be associated with unsolicited e-
mails from strangers containing controversial sexual material. Yet it is unclear that even this inva-
sive practice creates a compelling independent government interest, because it can be handled 
through another form of filtering that gives parents a great deal of choice. Unwelcome e-mail mes-
sages can be cut off by technology that empowers individual parents. For example, the system of-
fered by America Online allows parents to block all e-mail with illustrations or attachments, to post 
a list of senders whose mail should be delivered, with all other mail to be returned to sender, or to 
instruct the Internet provider not to deliver mail from certain senders. Under First Amendment doc-
trine, listeners may affirmatively decline to receive certain materials.310 Consistent with that tradi-
tion, parents who choose to do so can give their Internet provider a list of approved correspondents 
for their children (or themselves), and ask that mail from persons not on the list be returned to 
sender. Unwanted e-mail can also be deleted unread under parental supervision, just as unwanted 
postal service mail goes in the trash basket. 
 Filters installed in the home and administered by parents do not raise the same First Amendment 
problems as those installed in public libraries, where the state becomes the censor.311 Significant 
constitutional questions arise where the government installs filters or mandates the use of filters.312 
To the extent that filters and rating systems impose or are tied to potential state sanctions that limit 
what speech the young can receive, they risk becoming “a solemn ratification in constitutional terms 
of the ‘generation gap.’“313 
Government activities that neither regulate speech nor infronge on other protected liberties do 
not require a compelling interest. A range of government programs designed merely to provide in-
formation without categorizing or disfavoring any particular speech may enhance parental authority 
and pass constitutional muster.314 These programs include pamphlets containing advice on technol-
ogy that could help enforce the family’s rules, regulations requiring service providers to inform par-
ents about available blocking technology, and even warnings about unproven risks in herent in vari-
ous forms of media. The government has a rational interest in establishing a commission to examine 
existing research on whether controversial speech harms children.315 A rational basis is all that is 
necessary to justify government recommendations and reference materials designed to help all par-
ents make informed decisions about the rules they wish to impose on their own children, as long as 
the state does not inhibit speech itself. 
The economic market has demonstrated an ability to provide alternatives when a sufficient 
number of parents care strongly about protecting their children from controversial speech. Filters 
for television, monitored Internet sites,316 and tame computer games are achievable through the 
market if there is adequate consumer demand.317 Similarly, labels designed to inform parents but 
which are not attached to a screening mechanism, such as ratings of movies and musical recordings, 
do not require state action.318 
For example, since the rap group 2 Live Crew recorded a companion “clean” version of its 
sexually explicit album “As Nasty as They Wanna Be,” entitled “As Clean as They Wanna Be,”319 
retailers have made the release of expurgated rock music almost routine. Wal-Mart Stores, the na-
tion’s largest retailer, among others, refuses to stock audio or visual material that their managers 
regard as too sexually explicit or violent.320 Some record producers regularly provide a second ver-
sion of both the lyrics and the album cover to large retailers like Wal-Mart visibly labeled “clean,” 
or “sanitized for your protection.”321 As in other forms of First Amendment chill, some producers 
and artists tone down the original release so that major marketers will carry it.322 While such devel-
opments affect the range of speech available, they do not constitute state action so long as the impe-
tus really comes from stores and consumers.323 
On the other hand, in many rural areas a major chain might be the only retail outlet for music 
within a reasonable distance. Private choices may have an impact on the entertainment industry, be-
cause consumer purchases at large chains affect the sales charts.324 A chain store’s marketing deci-
sions may make controversial speech harder to obtain, but for purposes of constitutional analysis the 
distributor’s choice is not necessarily more significant than its choice of what color shirts to stock in 
any given fashion season. These private actions constrict the marketplace of ideas, even as they en-
hance the authority of conservative parents. But they do not implicate or require government action, 
thus further undermining the notion that state action is necessary to reinforce parental efforts to 
shield children from controversial speech. 
Producers and distributors cater to the demand for non-controversial entertainment by providing 
special fora. These include PAX, a cable network which offers only family-oriented programs,325 
 Christian radio and television stations, and the burgeoning industry of Christian rock.326 Pacifica 
Radio network and Playboy Enterprises--among other frequent parties to First Amendment litiga-
tion--respond to demand from a different group of listeners. When the market responds to particu-
larized tastes by enhancing the possibility of matching speakers to those who want to hear their 
message, it expands the marketplace of ideas for everyone. The marketplace could thus be respon-
sive to all levels of parental levels of tolerance. 
An expanded marketplace that reflects consumer preferences of all three types of parents, in-
cluding both the most restrictive and the most permissive nonconformist, facilitates parental deci-
sionmaking. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained, parental choice is an inherent 
part of the systems to which we adhere as a society. “The decision a parent must make,” about 
whether to install a filter on a computer is comparable to the decision about whether to block a 
phone line, to “keep sexually explicit books on the shelf or subscribe to adult magazines. No consti-
tutional principle is implicated. The responsibility for making such choices is where our society has 
traditionally placed it--on the shoulders of the parent.”327 
VI. THE STATE’S INDEPENDENT INTEREST IN SHIELDING CHILDREN 
REGARDLESS OF FAMILY PREFERENCES 
Proponents of regulation rely as well on a second potential interest, an independent state interest 
in shielding children. Under Turner, in order to show that such a government interest is compelling, 
the state must demonstrate the specific harm that flows from the speech it seeks to regulate. It must 
also show that the regulation is likely to diminish the risk of the identified harm. But in case after 
case, the proponents of government regulation have failed to articulate any specific harm to children 
that would establish such an independent compelling interest. 
A. The Government as Inculcator of Values for Citizenship 
The primary argument that government has an independent interest in regulating controversial 
speech that might reach minors builds on Prince v. Massachusetts, in which the Supreme Court up-
held the use of child labor and compulsory school laws to bar a child from proselytizing on the 
street with her family in the evening.328 The government’s interest in assuring the well-being of the 
next generation of citizens is unquestioned when the actions taken to promote healthy development 
do not impinge upon fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech or religion. Under Prince, gov-
ernment has a unique role to play in a democracy by ensuring “the healthy, well-rounded growth of 
young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.”329 In attempting to regulate speech 
that children might receive in their homes, proponents of regulation appear to claim that the lan-
guage “all that implies,” lacks any boundaries. The risk arises that the state would present itself as a 
“superparent.”330 
Those who favor state action designed to protect children from controversial speech base their 
arguments on children’s vulnerability and presumed lack of capacity to make critical choices or pro-
tect themselves. Anglo-American jurisprudence has frequently accepted, without question, the no-
tion that the average child experiences legal “disabilities” compared with the average adult.331 Even 
legal commentators who are committed to an expansive reading of the Speech Clause have accepted 
vulnerability as a justification for the state to restrict children’s speech rights.332 Concurring in 
Ginsberg, Justice Stewart emphasized that “children lack the full capacity for individual choice 
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”333 Without a presumption of capacity, 
 Justice Stewart argued, children are not free to participate in the “free trade in ideas” envisioned by 
Justice Holmes or to decide for themselves “what [they] will read and to what [they] will listen.”334 
Judicial acceptance of paternalism, the dominant doctrine supporting the notion that children 
need state regulation to shield them from speech, proceeds from an undifferentiated notion of chil-
dren’s vulnerability.335 In applying paternalistic presumptions, courts have failed to distinguish be-
tween rules made by the state and rules imposed by parents on their own children;336 between an 
eight-year-old and a person who will turn seventeen in the next month;337 and between choices 
made by the state about what children should read and hear in school and in the rest the universe 
they occupy outside of school hours.338 
A decade after Ginsberg, the Supreme Court clarified the characteristics of the age of minority, 
which it saw as threefold: (i) “the peculiar vulnerability of children”; (ii) “their inability to make 
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner”; and (iii) legal recognition of the importance of 
the “parental role in childrearing.”339 In the context of constitutional liberties, the Court underscored 
the legal significance of distinguishing between “mature” and “immature” minors, although it pro-
vided no guidelines to the lower courts on how to make that distinction.340 
The distinction remains important despite the lack of concrete guidance. In ACLU I, for exam-
ple, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion chastised the government for its failure to acknowledge the 
range of maturity represented during minority. “The strength of the government’s interest in pro-
tecting minors is not equally strong” for three-year-olds and seventeen-year-olds.341 For the fourteen 
years in between, the level of maturity required may well depend on what kind of decision the child 
is asking to make, and on the characteristics of the individual child. Parents are best equipped to 
make such subjective distinctions based on their knowledge about each child’s level of maturity.342 
The state, in contrast, can only make rules of general applicability. 
The government’s role in safeguarding children and promoting their development into responsi-
ble citizens generally falls into three categories: (i) regulation of juvenile behavior that could not be 
constrained for adults;343 (ii) protection from abuse and neglect;344 and (iii) education and inculca-
tion for citizenship.345 
The regulation of juvenile behavior generally has no bearing on restrictions on pure speech and 
requires no further discussion here. While conduct may, under certain circumstances, constitute pro-
tected speech,346 receipt of protected communications does not currently constitute conduct amena-
ble to punishment by the state.347 It is not unimaginable that in a regime which labeled selected 
speech as dangerous for the young, receipt of such speech could join the array of status offenses, 
i.e., acts such as truancy that are illegal only when committed by minors, and which are punishable 
by confinement. Parents cannot protect their children from state involvement by consenting to be-
havior that constitutes a status offense.348 
On the other hand, some parents turn to the juvenile justice system to help them discipline “in-
corrigible” young people. This pattern suggests that, if courts find a compelling interest in isolating 
children from controversial speech sufficient to turn receipt of speech into an act of delinquency, 
parents whose children break the family rules about television, movies, and music could turn the 
state into the enforcer of family discipline. Such an outcome, while extreme, builds logically from 
the arguments offered in support of regulation. If controversial speech threatens to turn children into 
criminals, a proposition which is open to question, as discussed below, why not treat adolescents 
who obtain such speech in the same way that courts treat teenagers who carry guns or sell drugs? 
 The second category--protection from abuse and neglect at the hands of parents and guardians--
might support a compelling governmental interest in regulating controversial speech if the govern-
ment could establish that such speech leads to serious physical, emotional, or psychological damage 
which, in turn, could be attributed to negligent parents.349 In Ginsberg, the Court correctly relied on 
Prince for the proposition that the state may intervene against parental wishes to “protect the wel-
fare of children” and to safeguard them from abuse.350 This approach seems to suggest that where 
the “imperfect normative family” or the “nonconformist family” fails to provide adequate supervi-
sion, the state could claim an independent role as guardian of last resort.351 Although one can imag-
ine a case where parents exposed a child to speech that crossed such a clear line that it constituted 
child abuse, such as reading sado-masochistic material that qualifies as obscene under Miller to a 
four-year-old, it seems unlikely that such speech-related behavior would be the only questionable 
acts committed by such parents. Because facts like these do not appear to occur frequently, and 
courts are unlikely to find such cases difficult to decide if they do arise, this issue does not require 
prolonged discussion. 
The third and most widespread area of state intervention is the state’s role in education. Public 
schools, the Supreme Court has held, are vital “in the preparation of individuals for participation as 
citizens.”352 Schools are the vehicles for “inculcating fundamental values necessary to the mainte-
nance of a democratic political system.”353 Under existing doctrine, the government has great lee-
way in assessing and regulating the content of speech when it functions as educator. 
Its role as educator and “inculcator of values” requires the state to make choices based on con-
tent and, at least sometimes, on viewpoint.354 It must, for example, create a curriculum consisting of 
required and perhaps elective materials, and select texts that cover the curricular areas.355 The cur-
riculum cannot accommodate every idea afloat in the marketplace of ideas, or even every possible 
topic. In the unique setting of schools, such choices normally are not held to violate constitutional 
norms because where the government is speaker, it must make choices by drawing selectively from 
the marketplace of ideas.356 Courts give school officials great leeway in making such choices.357 
Even though parents have some degree of choice about what kind of school their children attend--
public or private, religious or secular, licensed or home-based--state governments set minimum 
standards and curricular requirements that educational institutions must meet in order to satisfy 
compulsory education laws.358 When children attend public schools, the discretion that courts ac-
cord to local officials is vast.359 
Although it is possible to argue that the principles of free inquiry should prevail in schools out-
side of core curricular choices,360 courts have held that schools have “a significant measure of au-
thority” over many student activities.361 A plurality of the Supreme Court has indicated that officials 
may even remove books from the school library based on their subjective judgment of “educational 
suitability.”362 
Boards of education are not exempt, however, from the demands of the Bill of Rights. The dis-
cretion accorded public schools is bound by the underlying goal of promoting democracy and plu-
ralism. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Barnette, the fact that schools are “educating the 
young for citizenship is [particular] reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of 
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount im-
portant principles of our government as mere platitudes.”363 
The vast discretion accorded the state during school hours gives it a large bite at the apple.364 
The ability to inculcate values during the school day--in the curriculum, in the library, and in extra-
 curricular activities365 -- undermines the state’s position that its discretion to limit speech available 
to minors should extend outside of school and even into the home. When the proponents of regulat-
ing speech to shield children seek to expand the state’s discretion outside the educational context, 
they must overcome constitutional presumptions about both free expression and the zone of privacy 
that protects parental decisionmaking. 
Even if courts were to conclude that the state could justify expanding its inculcative function 
beyond the schools, the precedents within schools themselves alert us to the risks that government 
decisionmaking will threaten the autonomy of some portion of families. All over the country, school 
choices about material have provided a continuing source of controversy and litigation. School offi-
cials have proven vulnerable to political mobilization by small groups of activist parents. Parents 
with varying strongly-held beliefs relentlessly challenge the inclusion of books in the curriculum, in 
optional assignments, and in the library.366 They have challenged the exclusion of similar materi-
als.367 Communities are divided over sex education requirements and the content of such programs, 
as well as over whether schools should provide access to condoms to protect the health and life of 
students.368 In some school districts, parents with strongly-held religious views have objected to the 
use of movies, secular music, and even computers in the classroom.369 
Such controversies reiterate the divisions among family types, whether based on religion or 
other core values and beliefs. These differences render categorization of communications directed at 
children very difficult, even where the state has the greatest flexibility in making choices. Further, 
school systems have not demonstrated a reliable or uniform ability to withstand pressure from par-
ents or other groups with a clear social or religious agenda.370 Cultural battles in local schools sug-
gest that national efforts to label or to regulate communications in an effort to shield children will 
be rife with disagreements based on differing world views, creating genuine cause for concern that 
government regulation of controversial speech will incorporate viewpoint as well as content dis-
crimination.371 
B. Identifying Harm 
As Turner made clear, for the government to meet its burden to demonstrate a compelling inter-
est in regulating speech, it must do more than allege that a harm exists. The state must present evi-
dence that the harm is real, not merely conjectural, and show a nexus between the speech and the 
harm indicating that the regulation will alleviate the harm “in a direct and material way.”372 Propo-
nents of regulation have not yet identified the required specific harm and nexus in their efforts to 
defend any of the regulations on speech that purportedly places children at risk. 
Although decided under a mere rational basis test, Ginsberg contains the Supreme Court’s most 
detailed analysis of the government’s independent interest in shielding children from speech.373 Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for a majority of five, agreed that the risks of pornography reaching children 
required an insurance policy against parental inadequacy: 
 
While the supervision of children’s reading may best be left to their parents, the knowl-
edge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and society’s tran-
scendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of 
the sale of material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a state to 
include in a statute designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children special 
standards, broader than those [regulating sales to adults].374 
 
 But pornography is not protected speech, and was never alleged to be at stake in the controversial 
speech regulated by the legislation overturned in ACLU I, Denver Area, or Sable. 
In order to establish the harm necessary to support a judicial finding of a compelling interest, 
proponents of regulating speech first must show that the speech they wish to abridge actually 
reaches children in significant numbers, and then must demonstrate the harm to the children whom 
the speech reaches. Both of these inquiries bear directly on whether the harm is real or merely con-
jectural. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly chastised the proponents of regulation for failing to demon-
strate that the targeted speech even reaches children with any frequency--let alone harms them. In 
ACLU I, the Supreme Court relied on the government’s concession below that children would rarely 
if ever stumble upon controversial material on the Internet by accident and, if they did, they would 
be warned to leave the site before viewing it.375 The few examples of controversial or obscene sites 
discovered by inadvertence turned out to be sites accessed because the government’s expert already 
knew that the key words he was using would pull up material barred under the CDA, rather than 
sites that real children had found.376 The paucity of evidence offered may be explained in part by 
the informal reports that adult patrons almost never use Internet access in libraries to find “mildly 
pornographic” or explicit sites, and librarians informally monitor children who seek pornographic 
sites.377 Regulations on cable television suffer from the same constitutional infirmity. In Denver 
Area, the Supreme Court criticized the government for presenting only “anecdotal references to 
what seem isolated instances of potentially indecent programming,”378 “borderline examples as to 
which people may differ.”379 The government failed to show that controversial speech existed on 
PEGs, much less that it harmed children. 
Lower courts have made similar findings. In regulating controversial speech on public radio, for 
example, the FCC ignored the fact that teenagers comprised only 0.2% of the audience for public 
radio, and further insisted that it had no obligation totake data on listening habits into account.380 An 
undercover officer in New York State who logged over 600 hours on the Internet failed to identify a 
single case that could not have been prosecuted under existing statutes criminalizing child pornog-
raphy.381 
In addition to showing that controversial speech actually reaches children regularly through the 
targeted means of communication, those who wish to abridge speech to protect children must isolate 
the specific harm such speech causes to children who receive it. But this requirement has also re-
ceived short shrift. When Congress passed the CDA, for example, it expressly rejected language 
that would have limited the Act’s reach to materials deemed “harmful to minors.”382 The legislative 
history, sparse as it is, specifically indicates a Congressional intent to reach beyond the “harmful to 
minors” standard upheld for unprotected speech in Ginsberg.383 As Judge Dalzell observed in his 
separate opinion in ACLU I, the interest in protecting children “is as dangerous as it is compelling,” 
because it has no limiting principle.384 
Even where legislators try to stay within the rubric of the “harmful to minors” standard, the sup-
porters of regulation have failed to show that exposure to controversial (as opposed to obscene or 
violent) speech in fact harms minors, as it is required to do under Turner.385 For example, Chief 
Judge Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit, after several hearings on the regulation of inde-
cent cable broadcast that was ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court in Denver Area, con-
cluded that the “government has not offered one shred of evidence that indecent programming 
harms children.”386 
 The design and results of empirical studies about the effects of speech make it important to dis-
tinguish speech about sexuality from speech about violence. Although it is nearly impossible to find 
an iota of evidence that controversial speech about sex harms children,387 speech concerned with 
sexuality is the content most commonly subject to regulation on their behalf, in contrast to speech 
with violent content.388 For example, during one debate, five of the eight articles cited on the Senate 
floor in support of regulating indecent speech expressly examined the impact of material about vio-
lence or suicide rather than the indecency targeted by the legislation.389 The FCC, in turn, relied on 
the same evidence about violent speech in defending its abridgement of sexually explicit speech that 
it did not dispute was protected under the First Amendment.390 
In contrast to the dearth of support for the notion that sexually explicit speech is harmful, sub-
stantial social science research conducted over several decades lends support to the allegation that 
violent speech may lead some children to violent attitudes or actions.391 Even this research, how-
ever, is not uncontroverted.392 One unresolved issue is that mere correlations do not equal a nexus, 
or indicate that abridging speech will reduce harm.393 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
was persuaded by expert testimony that “TV violence studies do not provide strong evidence that 
TV violence causes criminal behavior or aggression.”394 Another problem is that the results of so-
cial science research focused primarily on television and movies395 are frequently attributed to other 
forms of speech. The Second Circuit criticized the defense of a regulation on trading cards depicting 
violence based on inconclusive evidence about the very different medium of television, “a far more 
powerful medium.”396 
Although social scientists point to correlations between violence in the media and violent behav-
ior, they have not found evidence that exposure to depictions of violence causes or even contributes 
to antisocial behavior.397 Social scientist James Q. Wilson, a political conservative, recently con-
cluded that there is “virtually no evidence” that violence on television and in the movies “affects the 
serious crime rate,” which has been falling even as entertainment has become “more gruesome.”398 
Other commentators, starting from the perspective that there is more evidence to justify regulation 
of media violence than other forms of controversial speech, have concluded that existing social sci-
ence data do not provide “a basis upon which one may determine with adequate certainty which 
violent programs cause harmful behavior.”399 
Similar evidentiary weaknesses help to explain the fact that no court has ever found civil liabil-
ity for violence based on the influence of controversial speech.400 Courts have refused to find causa-
tion in tort actions even where the violent acts were committed contemporaneously with exposure to 
the speech.401 This line of cases suggests that the link between speech that depicts violence and vio-
lent actions is not sufficient to satisfy the standard of causation under tort law. Presumably, the 
nexus would have to be even stronger to satisfy the government’s burden of proof in establishing a 
compelling interest in suppressing protected speech. 
For all of these reasons, the second compelling interest offered for regulating speech, the gov-
ernment’s independent interest, fares no better than its first interest of reinforcing parental authority. 
In the future, if proponents of regulating speech to protect children succeeded in meeting their bur-
den of proof on each element needed to show a compelling interest, the issue still would not be re-
solved. Then, and only then, would a court actually confront a close question about whether the 
regulation would survive constitutional scrutiny, requiring it to balance the weight of competing 
constitutional interests. At that point, the courts would have before them a question of balancing at 
the margin, that would permit comparing “the incremental promotion of the interest on which the 
 government relies with the incremental threat to freedom of expression.”402 That balancing would 
include consideration of the mode and sweep of the regulation and other values such as parental 
autonomy. 
VII. THE CRITIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST APPLIED TO GERMANE 
LOWER COURT OPINIONS 
Notwithstanding the pervasive dicta to the effect that the government has a compelling interest 
in shielding children from controversial speech, only a handful of lower courts have squarely con-
sidered and ruled on the proposition.403 Those courts are divided as to whether the government’s 
interest met the standard of “compelling,” sufficient to justify narrowly tailored limitations on 
speech. A brief review of these decisions, in light of the previous discussion of the government in-
terests generally asserted, clarifies how analyzing the compelling interest can improve the quality of 
judicial reasoning with respect to controversial speech and children. 
A. Decisions Rejecting the Government’s Asserted Interest in Protecting Minors from Speech 
In Video Software Dealers Association v. Webster and Eclipse Enterprises v. Gulotta, the Courts 
of Appeals for the Eighth and Second Circuits overturned statutes designed to protect children from 
violent material on videocassettes, and in trading cards depicting crimes.404 Both courts agreed on 
several baseline points. Depictions of violence, they held, fall within the umbrella of the Speech 
Clause, so efforts to regulate violent speech are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring that the regula-
tion serve a compelling government interest.405 In each case, the state relied on its general power to 
protect children,406 but both courts demanded that the government demonstrate a more precise com-
pelling interest tied to a direct harm to children, and held that the government had failed to do so. 
In Video Software, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the state’s failure to ar-
ticulate whether it was concerned with “all kinds of violence” or only with “slasher” movies was 
fatal to its efforts to restrict access to films.407 The court rejected out-of-hand the state’s assertion 
that its “power to protect children” allowed it to suppress speech “that is neither obscene as to 
youths not subject to some other legitimate proscription . . . solely to protect the young from ideas 
or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”408 The court made clear that the state 
must identify the precise nature of the harm it is trying to prevent in order for the court to assess 
whether or not the statute is narrowly drawn.409 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went a step further in Eclipse, holding that the 
government had failed to “demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and 
that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms.”410 The government had failed to offer any-
thing more than surmise and conclusory statements to show that crime trading cards either harm 
minors or cause juvenile delinquency.411 The court expressly held that the statute barring dissemina-
tion of crime trading cards was not “necessary” to protect young people.412 
In AIDS Action Committee of Massachusetts v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority the 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts sent a message to proponents of regulation: where 
the government fails to demonstrate a compelling interest, it should expect the court to overturn the 
regulation without discussing narrow tailoring.413 Judge Zobel rejected the agency’s argument that 
the possibility of harm to children could outweigh the rights of speakers to post safe sex ads pro-
moting condom use.414 Moreover, the court found that the constitutional “interests of minors in re-
ceiving information trump the government’s interest in insulating them from that same informa-
 tion.”415 AIDS Action provides a model of how courts should cut their inquiry short once the gov-
ernment fails to demonstrate a compelling interest.416 
B. Lower Court Cases Finding a Compelling Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial 
Speech 
The three cases in which lower courts expressly sustained the compelling interest offered by the 
government do not resolve the broader question of the nature of the state’s interest in regulating 
controversial speech that may reach children, because each decision is tied to the factual context of 
the case in accordance with the principle that Speech Clause analysis must be conducted on a case-
by-case basis.417 Taken together, these three cases suggest that where a court concludes that the 
government has met its burden to establish a concrete and clearly articulated compelling interest, 
then the court is able to consider with greater precision whether the regulation is narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest. 
In Bering v. SHARE, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, sitting en banc, expressly 
found that the state had a compelling interest in regulating speech to protect children through an in-
junction limiting speech by anti-abortion picketers. The lower court had enjoined picketers’ oral use 
of the words “murder,” “kill,” and “their derivatives” during their demonstration and barred them 
from marching in front of the single entrance to the Medical Building which housed a number of 
doctors’ offices, including the office where abortions were performed.418 The court focused initially 
on the question of “whether the State has a compelling interest in protecting . . . children by limiting 
the oral expression of the proscribed words at the picket site.”419 After a hearing, the lower court 
had found that the anti-abortion picketers interfered with parents who were bringing their children 
to see a pediatric allergist in the Medical Building. Specifically, the picketers referred to the doctors 
collectively as “killers or murderers in the presence of young children.”420 Experts testified that this 
verbal assault disturbed the children and undermined their trust in their doctors.421 
In light of these facts, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington found that the state had es-
tablished a compelling interest in preventing such speech in the presence of children.422 First, the 
court emphasized that the injunction served the rights of parents by helping them to protect their 
children from verbal assault and allowing them to “explain the concept of abortion to their children 
personally, and only when they believe the children are able to understand it.”423 Second, the court 
found that the government’s “independent interest in the well-being of its youth”424 was compelling 
where the trial court expressly found that the specific language, when directed at young children, 
was abusive and interfered with the ability of doctors to treat young children effectively.425 The 
court concluded that the state had established “a compelling interest in avoiding subjection of chil-
dren to the physical and psychological abuse inflicted by the picketers’ speech.”426 
Even though the injunction was relatively narrow because it did not bar use of the same words 
on placards and was designed solely to protect children who were too young to read, the state Su-
preme Court held that the articulated interest did not support the terms of the injunction, which the 
court found would “water down speech to make it suitable for the sandbox.”427 The court remanded 
the case for even more specific findings to pin down the precise scope of the government’s compel-
ling interest. It instructed the lower court to determine the ages at which the speech would be most 
harmful to children. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington further ordered that the injunc-
tion be narrowed to proscribe the offensive language only when children within that precisely de-
fined age range are present, and also that the injunction be modified to provide guidance to picket-
ers about how to assess the ages of children.428 Bering underscores the importance of both specific-
 ity and a nuanced concern for context in speech cases.429 It suggests that courts are better equipped 
to decide whether a regulation is narrowly tailored when they understand precisely what the regula-
tion aims to accomplish. Where judicial analysis sustains the government’s compelling interest, the 
rigor demanded by sound legal argument is more likely to lead to regulation that is carefully cir-
cumscribed to tread lightly on protected speech. 
In ACT v. FCC (“ACT III”), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en 
banc held that the government has a compelling interest in “supporting parental supervision of what 
children see and hear,” as well as a compelling governmental interest in the well-being of minors, 
each of which was deemed sufficient to justify a ban on indecent radio broadcasts with a brief “safe 
harbor.”430 The en banc opinion resolved a lengthy struggle among the three branches of govern-
ment about regulation of indecent speech on the radio. The court remanded the matter to the FCC 
with instructions to revise its regulations to provide a slightly longer safe harbor for the broadcast of 
indecent speech on radio.431 The District of Columbia Circuit Court considered the FCC’s regula-
tions on controversial speech within the confines of the much-criticized Pacifica decision. The con-
text of radio broadcasts gave the FCC a foot up in arguing that the Supreme Court had already 
found the interests compelling. Once the court deferred to that position, the only remaining question 
appeared to be whether the regulation was narrowly crafted--which the court held it was not. ACT 
III illustrates the importance of analyzing the interests asserted by the government, because in the 
context of those articulated interests, the court was able to conclude that the means did not appro-
priately serve the proclaimed ends. 
Finally, in Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States (“Playboy II”), a case pending before 
the Supreme Court,432 the United States District Court for the District of Delaware found a compel-
ling interest in shielding children from “signal bleed,” which occurs when portions of the video or 
audio from a subscription cable channel appear to non-subscribers despite the cable operator’s ef-
forts to limit the signals to subscribers. Congress addressed the problem of signal bleed in Section 
505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which is the subject of a facial challenge in Playboy 
II.433 Section 505 requires cable television operators to “scramble” subscription (premium) channels 
specializing in sexually explicit adult programming in order to “protect children from signal bleed,” 
or to limit their broadcasts of explicit material to “safe harbor” hours in the middle of the night.434 
Scrambling eliminates the possibility that non-subscribers could accidentally receive visual or audio 
signals which they do not seek. 
A series of opinions by Judge Roth of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expressly con-
sidered “whether [the statute] survives strict scrutiny by addressing a compelling interest.”435 The 
court took Denver Area as its starting point, noting that content-based strict scrutiny applies to regu-
lations on cable television, and that Denver Area had expressly defined the interest asserted before 
the Court as “the protection of children from exposure to patently offensive depictions of sex”--the 
“same problems” that led to enactment of Section 505. It then distinguished the statute overturned 
in Denver Area from Section 505 on two grounds. First, Judge Roth explained that the target of Sec-
tion 505 was not the protected speech itself, but rather “signal bleed, a secondary effect of the 
transmission of that speech.”436 Second, Judge Roth distinguished the speech at issue in Section 505 
from most other efforts to regulate speech because the signal bleed intrudes into the homes of per-
sons who have chosen not to subscribe and thus expect not to receive explicit programming.437 The 
court declined to grant a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the panel’s decision 
in Playboy I by memorandum opinion.438 
 Plaintiff Playboy ultimately obtained an injunction enjoining enforcement of Section 505 fol-
lowing a trial at which Judge Roth presided.439 In granting the injunction, the court once more ex-
pressly considered the nature of the interest offered by proponents of Section 505. Because it had 
admonished the parties during the preliminary hearing not to return without briefing the nature and 
scope of the government’s interest and providing “additional evidence demonstrating the effects of 
sexually explicit materials on children,”440 the court criticized the “paucity” of the government’s 
evidence. In particular, Judge Roth regarded two important questions as unanswered by the gov-
ernment’s presentation: “does viewing signal bleed of sexually explicit programming constitute a 
harm to children?,” and does signal bleed even constitute a pervasive problem?441 Subsequently, at 
oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Justices noted more than once that the record failed to 
answer either of these questions.442 Instead, at the evidentiary hearing, the government relied on 
studies of the effect of televised violence on children, which the lower court deemed inapposite to 
regulations on sexually explicit speech, and offered no evidence at all on the effects of “intermittent 
signal bleed” as opposed to “explicit pornography.”443 Even though it acknowledged that the “mere 
articulation of a theoretical harm is not enough” to establish a compelling government interest under 
normal circumstances, the court concluded that the standard of proof was lower where protection of 
children was at issue.444 
Applying its own new flexible standard that “only some minimal amount of evidence is required 
when sexually explicit programming and children are involved,” the court reluctantly held that the 
government had established a sufficient risk of harm to constitute a compelling interest.445 Nonethe-
less, the court enjoined enforcement of Section 505 because the statute was not narrowly tailored to 
use the least restrictive means of regulating the controversial speech: a cable lockbox which would 
allow parents to block signal bleed from entering their homes, combined with a requirement that 
cable providers notify all subscribers that blocking devices are available without charge. 
The district court in Playboy II correctly demanded that the government present evidence sup-
porting its claim to a compelling interest, but the court failed to follow its analysis to the requisite 
conclusion. Even though the government failed to show that signal bleed actually reaches children 
with any regularity, or that intermittent signal bleed harms children when it reaches them, the court 
found that the cumulative merits of the government’s purported interests sufficed under a relaxed 
standard, which it erroneously assumed should apply because children were involved. In this re-
spect, the Playboy II court fell short of the more rigorous analysis performed by the courts in both 
AIDS Action, which found that the government failed to show a compelling interest,446 and Bering 
v. SHARE, which held that a very narrowly defined compelling interest existed, justifying an even 
narrower regulation on speech.447 
C. Pending Appellate Litigation: Playboy II and ACLU II 
Two important cases which would allow appellate courts to examine the nature of the govern-
ment’s purported interest in regulating controversial speech to protect children are currently under-
going review: Playboy II and ACLU II. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the govern-
ment’s appeal of the decision below in Playboy II on November 30, 1999; the case is pending as 
this Article goes to press.448 Playboy II offers an excellent opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
clarify that it is not sufficient for the government to invoke the needs of children in order to estab-
lish a compelling interest that will justify regulations on speech that is protected for adults.449 
The Supreme Court might well use Playboy II to emphasize that the government faces the same 
burden of establishing a compelling interest where the speech of all members of the community is 
 regulated with the express aim of protecting children as in any other case. The need for such analy-
sis may be even more pressing when the government’s purported purpose is to protect children be-
cause the cultural temptations to take that interest at face value are so strong. Even if the Supreme 
Court declines to raise the issue sua sponte in Playboy II and decides the case entirely on other 
grounds, the case illustrates how imperative it is not only to scrutinize the government’s purported 
interest in shielding children from controversial speech, but to also insist that the government meet 
its constitutional burden to establish that interest. 
An appeal is also pending before the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in ACLU II. Revisit-
ing the problem of children and controversial speech on the Internet after the Supreme Court’s 1997 
decision in ACLU I, Congress enacted the Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (“COPA”), 
which was to go into effect in November of 1998. COPA makes it a criminal offense for a person 
engaged in the business of communicating on the World Wide Web to knowingly post communica-
tions “harmful to minors.”450 A federal district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of COPA 
before it took effect.451 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard oral argument in the matter 
on November 4, 1999, and the court has not yet issued its decision. 
The district court in ACLU II did not examine the government’s asserted interest, except to note 
that “the government clearly has an interest in the protection of minors, including shielding them 
from materials that are not obscene by adult standards.”452 Congressional findings make clear that 
COPA relies primarily on the government’s alleged independent interest in deciding what speech 
minors should be able to receive. Congress expressly stated that “innovative ways to help parents . . 
. restrict material that is harmful to minors through parental control protections and self-regulation . 
. . have not provided a national solution to the problem of minors accessing harmful material on the 
World Wide Web.”453 Parents, the government repeatedly asserts, cannot be trusted to protect their 
children in ways that meet congressional approval.454 
At the time it passed the CDA, overturned in ACLU I, Congress did not examine which speech, 
if any, actually harms the young and expressly rejected the modifying phrase “harmful to minors” 
as too narrow.455 In COPA, Congress again made no effort to determine what sort of controversial 
computer speech, if any, in fact harms minors.456 Instead, COPA defines the material “harmful to 
minors” as including all communications that meet a statutory variable obscenity standard based on 
the Miller test, refined for minors on the assumption that such material is harmful rather than merely 
distasteful when it reaches minors.457 The approach closely mirrors the state statute upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Ginsberg.458 But Ginsberg indicates that material does not meet the definition of 
variable obscenity under the statute unless the communications “taken as a whole, lack[] serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.”459 COPA’s own language, however, belies 
a facial effort to limit its scope to material that fits the Ginsberg model. Despite its initial reliance 
on a definition of material “harmful to minors” that mirrors the test for obscenity, COPA bars com-
mercial Internet communications that “include[] any material” harmful to minors. The phrase “any 
material” suggests that analysis of the value of the speech would not be confined to the communica-
tion “taken as a whole.”460 Moreover, COPA is both over- and under-inclusive because it would 
reach some arguably indecent sexual speech which has not been shown to lead to concrete harms, 
but would fail to reach depictions of violence unless they also fall into the category of variable ob-
scenity, even though the evidence is stronger that depictions of violence harm children more than 
sexually explicit speech harms children. 
 In addition, the statute appears to reach a much broader array of sexually explicit speech than 
the speech which meets a definition of variable obscenity for minors. In granting a preliminary in-
junction, the district court ruled that COPA could threaten valuable content including “resources on 
obstetrics, gynecology and sexual health; visual art and poetry . . . information about [non-obscene] 
books and photographic images offered for sale; and online magazines,” even news magazines.461 
COPA provides an affirmative defense to speakers who restrict access to their web sites by re-
quiring proof of age through means such as credit cards or identification numbers. The imposition 
of adult identification requirements as a mode of regulating speech at first glance seems constitu-
tionally palatable462 compared to bans or channeling, at least to the extent that it resembles proof of 
age to purchase liquor or tobacco. But it is not legal for minors to purchase or consume alcohol or 
tobacco and consumption of such products does not enjoy constitutional protection. Controversial 
speech, in contrast, is constitutionally protected. 
Equally important from a doctrinal vantage point, as the district court found in ACLU II, a risk 
exists that adult identification will be transformed into a requirement that consenting adults affirma-
tively request controversial speech and identify themselves before entering Internet sites.463 While 
adults may choose to identify themselves by using credit cards in bookstores, or by checking out 
library books, they can preserve anonymity in acquiring many forms of speech by paying cash or 
browsing. Forcing adults either to identify themselves to request speech or to forgo the speech alto-
gether violates the holding of the Supreme Court in Lamont v. Postmaster General that imposing an 
affirmative obligation on a person who wishes to receive unpopular speech violates the First 
Amendment.464 
Adult identification regimes that allow parents to obtain controversial material for minors or en-
compass the possibility of verifiable parental consent for those under the age of majority may be 
conducive to accommodating the range of family types from the idealized normative to the noncon-
formist, depending on whether the nature of the medium makes such identification schemes feasi-
ble. Newsstands, bookstores, libraries, movie theaters, video rental stores and even dial-a-porn 
businesses can establish effective adult identification at a reasonable cost. For Internet communica-
tions, however, the Supreme Court found in ACLU I that no reliable technology currently exists “to 
determine the age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups 
or chat rooms.”465 The government did not contest this finding in ACLU II.466 To the extent that age 
verification is currently technologically feasible on the Internet, courts have found that verification 
would be “prohibitively expensive” for many speakers with inherently valuable messages.467 Be-
cause it is not currently feasible to segregate material that is obscene for minors from material that 
is protected and valuable for minors on websites (as opposed to magazine stands and video stores), 
Ginsberg is inapposite to computer communications.468 Limitations designed to protect children 
from Internet speech will chill speakers and inhibit the speech available to adults.469 
It may not be sufficient, however, to distinguish Ginsberg in the Internet context, or to limit its 
applicability based on its use of the rational basis standard. COPA confronts us with the underlying 
flaws in the Ginsberg analysis. COPA, like Ginsberg and the entire concept of variable obscenity, 
fails to draw comprehensible lines for speakers and those who distribute speech. By failing to define 
the specific types of speech that harm children and to articulate the nexus between that speech and 
the harm, regulators may unleash a regime of unbridled censorship.470 The statutory definition of 
variable obscenity brings us no closer to understanding how to delineate the speech that is protected 
from being labeled “obscene for minors” because it is valuable for children. COPA would likely 
 prevent children from receiving valuable speech to which their parents may wish them to have free 
access by limiting the availability of speech with artistic, literary, and educational value.471 COPA’s 
definition of variable obscenity makes no provision for differentiating speech that has social value 
for three-year-olds from speech that has value for mature adolescents. But assessment of value will 
vary depending on the individual youngster’s maturity and ability to use information thoughtfully, 
which parents can interpret in each instance, but the government cannot. 
The notion of variable obscenity leaves the question of what speech is harmful unresolved de-
spite the congressional effort to create a definitional tautology that equates variable obscenity with 
harm to minors. Variable obscenity, directed at speech which would be merely “indecent” for 
adults, raises all of the issues of subjectivity which plague efforts to define indecent speech directed 
at adults.472 Nor does the construct of variable obscenity answer the threshold question of whether 
the state is entitled to make value judgments about speech on behalf of the young, or whether such 
decisions are reserved for parents. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
At times, the struggle over controversial speech appears to be a war between “two ancient ene-
mies: Anything Goes and Enough Already,” as one federal judge observed in holding a rap re-
cording obscene.473 When sensitive matters of freedom of speech collide with images of children’s 
vulnerability, and are framed in terms of the battle between good and evil, even well intentioned 
people can lose sight of fundamental constitutional principles. In the process, the requirement that 
courts apply each element of strict scrutiny to regulations on speech has all but evaporated. 
Faced with the justification of shielding children, courts have repeatedly failed to apply the 
standard enunciated in Turner, which requires the government to demonstrate a compelling interest 
in regulating protected speech. In all of the major cases decided by the Supreme Court, the state has 
failed to meet its burden with respect to the three elements of a compelling interest: the state has 
failed to articulate the precise harm it seeks to address; the state has failed to establish a nexus be-
tween the regulated speech and the specific harm; and the state has failed to do more than speculate 
that the restriction of speech will alleviate the articulated harm. 
Neither of the interests most commonly alleged by the government to support regulations of 
controversial speech stands up to strict scrutiny. As Part V makes clear, the government’s professed 
interest in reinforcing parental authority often clashes with principles of family autonomy and cul-
tural pluralism that are central to the Constitution. The state’s evaluation of speech undercuts the 
authority of parents who do not share normative cultural values. In order to empower parents in a 
constitutionally permissible manner, government regulation on speech would have to support 
equally the choices made by the idealized normative family, the imperfect normative family and by 
all manifestations of the nonconformist family. Instead, by replacing parental judgment with its 
own, the state threatens a new level of intrusion into the family. 
The second compelling interest offered by the government--an independent interest in protecting 
children regardless of their parents’ preferences--also threatens state interference in the family. The 
government’s claim of an independent interest often reflects concerns about social anxieties and 
personal morality rather than any demonstrable harm precisely linked to the speech. The realm of 
cultural morality is best left to informal gatekeepers of social norms and may not be appropriate for 
legal remedies within the framework of the Constitution.474 
 Moreover, even if either of the two interests that the government offers as compelling were to 
withstand scrutiny, they appear to be mutually exclusive. The state cannot simultaneously claim to 
reinforce the authority of all parents and proclaim its own independent interest in sheltering children 
from speech that their parents allow them to receive. Under the Speech Clause, only parental au-
thority and discipline stand between minors and protected speech absent clear evidence that the 
speech causes a specific harm. 
The flaws in the government’s reasoning suggest that regulations of speech to protect children 
will more often than not fail to meet the stringent requirements of the Speech Clause. In most in-
stances, the burden on the government to establish a compelling interest will probably prove insur-
mountable when formulated in broad terms.475 Regulations on controversial speech imposed under 
the guise of protecting children face additional constitutional hurdles even if the government were 
to satisfy all three elements of the Turner test. After satisfying the requirements of Turner, the gov-
ernment would still have to convince a court that the regulation should survive balancing of compet-
ing interests at the margin and met requirements such as narrow tailoring. 
It is not necessarily impossible for the state to satisfy the strictures of Turner in regulating care-
fully defined controversial speech tied to a specific harm to children. In some circumstances, the 
state may be able to establish a compelling interest in protecting children that comports with the re-
quirements of both the Speech Clause and the doctrine of family autonomy. To do so, legislatures 
and administrative agencies would need to demonstrate that the speech actually harms children, that 
the private market or other means are unable to provide remedies for parents who seek them, and 
that the regulation would actually facilitate the choices made by parents, including all of the diverse 
views of nonconformist parents. Any effort to craft regulations that satisfy those conditions will call 
for a great deal more precision than has generally been exercised in this sensitive area. As analysis 
of narrow bans on anti-abortion demonstrators in Bering v. SHARE made clear, the more precisely 
the state defines the purported harm, and the narrower the state’s purported interests, the more likely 
it becomes that the state will be able to demonstrate a harm that can be ameliorated by a narrowly 
crafted regulation. 
Serious attention to the doctrinal framework developed in this Article would help all three 
branches of government to keep the mandates of the Speech Clause clearly before them when deal-
ing with the emotionally charged issues raised by children and controversial speech. To articulate 
the state’s compelling interest in a manner that will withstand constitutional scrutiny, legislators, 
regulators, and judges must use a fine brush rather than a paint roller when they try to shield chil-
dren. To the extent that government actors fail to demonstrate the requisite sensitivity when regulat-
ing speech to protect children, plaintiffs who seek to overturn restrictions on speech may wish tore-
consider the traditional reluctance to challenge the government’s alleged interest. 
The state has frequently disregarded a range of constitutional principles in the quest to safeguard 
children.476 Widespread tolerance for intrusions on the rights of minors, and of adults in the name of 
protecting minors, is predicated on the misconception that the resulting compromises are small and 
that the rights at stake are relatively insignificant. That complacency is unwarranted. The compro-
mises to free speech and family autonomy are great, and the rights affected lie at the heart of consti-
tutional liberties. The Supreme Court warned against such encroachment over one hundred years 
ago: “It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate 
and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.”477 
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 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (No. 93-1092) (citing Ferber to support the government's com-
pelling interest in safeguarding children in the context of regulating indecent speech on television). 
 
 103 See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (ruling that obscene tele-
phone messages lie outside the protection of the First Amendment). 
 
 104 See id. (observing that the First Amendment protects the right of adults to engage in or receive 
indecent speech). 
 
 105 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 872-73 (finding that the 
Miller test remains the applicable standard for gauging obscenity). But see Miller, 413 U.S. at 41 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that obscenity cases "have no business being in the courts") (cita-
tions omitted). Dissenting in the companion case of Paris Adult Theater, Justice Brennan argued 
that obscenity should be brought within the protection of the First Amendment because, among 
other things, despite numerous attempts the Supreme Court had "failed to formulate a standard that 
sharply distinguished protected from unprotected speech." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 
49, 83 (1973) (joined by Stewart, J. and Marshall, J.). Justice Douglas, who consistently maintained 
that the government could not regulate speech on the basis that it contained sexually oriented matter 
filed a separate dissent. See id. at 70. The lack of consensus among the Justices long predated 
Miller. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 705 n.1 (1968) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). The Supreme Court's efforts to define obscenity leave observers in "utter bewilderment" 
having resulted in a wide array of views in no less than 55 separate opinions among the Justices in 
the thirteen cases decided since Roth. Id.; see also Sable, 492 U.S. at 133 (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). "The concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and 
clarity to provide fair notice to persons" who might be charged with violating criminal statutes. Id. 
(quoting Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 103). 
Some scholars argue that material that satisfies the Miller definition of obscenity should nonetheless 
be encompassed by First Amendment protections, but that debate is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. See, e.g., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX 
AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 59-60, 73, 82 (1995) (criticizing the approach of 
feminist scholars Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon); Freedman, supra note 52, at 931-43 
(arguing that First Amendment exceptions threaten to render free speech protections dramatically 
weakened). For purposes of the argument here, however, let us assume that we will recognize ob-
scenity "when [we] see it," since it is not the subject of analysis.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 
 106 ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 872 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)); see Sable, 492 
U.S. at 124 (ruling that the First Amendment protects indecent speech). Some observers object that 
the legal test for obscenity does not reach all material that many citizens would regard as hard-core 
pornography, especially when the test is applied according to the contemporary norms in liberal 
communities. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT III"), 58 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (en banc) (describing Deep Throat as "notorious" and grouping it with "hard-core pornogra-
phy" not reached by obscenity laws); United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 
Schedule No. 2102, 709 F.2d 132, 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding various detailed portrayals of 
 sexual acts--including the movies "Debbie Does Dallas" and "Deep Throat"--not obscene under the 
community standards of New York City). 
 
 107 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968). 
 
 108 Id. at 638 (Brennan, J.) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("The power 
of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over 
adults.")). 
 
 109 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1956). The Roth test asks whether, to the aver-
age person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken 
as a whole, appeals to prurient interests. Id. 
 
 110 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965)); see 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975). Subsequent to Ginsberg, the Court 
rejected the Roth-Memoirs test for obscenity, and substituted the Miller test; the Court has "not had 
occasion to decide what effect Miller will have on the Ginsberg formulation." Erznoznik, 422 U.S. 
at 213 n.10. 
 
 111 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966)). The state 
has an interest in barring distribution of materials to children that may be suitable for adults. See 
Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75 (1966). 
 
 112 In considering a facial challenge to a ban on nudity on the screens of drive-in movie theaters, the 
Supreme Court observed that "the only narrowing construction which occurs to us would be to limit 
the ordinance to movies that are obscene as to minors." Erznoznick, 422 U.S. at 213 n.10, 216 n.15. 
The Court did not reach the question, in part because neither party argued for such a limiting con-
struction. See id.; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 697 n.22 (1977) (finding 
Ginsberg inapposite to non-obscene, protected material); American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 
1493, 1501 (11th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Ginsberg to hold that a state may "deny minors all access 
in any form to materials obscene as to them"); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747, 751-52 
(8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a school's definition of "obscene to minors" is sufficiently specific); 
Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 997 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that "minors have more restricted 
right than adults to sexually oriented material"). 
 
 113 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641. 
 
 114 Id. at 641, 643 (contrasting the legislative finding in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), in 
which there was no rational basis for finding the teaching of the German language harmful). 
 
 115 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641. It is worth noting that if Ginsberg had come before a Court made 
up of the identical Justices five years later, the outcome in Ginsberg would almost certainly have 
 been different. Justice Brennan would not have authored the opinion, and probably would not have 
signed it. By 1973, Justice Brennan, who had authored the Court's first express holding on the con-
stitutional status of obscenity in Roth, had concluded that there was no way to craft a constitution-
ally sustainable definition of obscenity, as he indicated in his dissent from Paris Adult Theater I v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and its companion case, Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15, 47 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, who voted with the majority 
in Ginsberg, and Justice Stewart, who concurred in Ginsberg, both joined Justice Brennan's dissents 
in Miller and Paris Adult Theatre. Presumably, if there is no way to define obscenity for adults, the 
drafting problems do not disappear just because the standard is a "variable" one for minors. See 
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 673 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 
 116 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642-43 (citing Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911)). 
 
 117 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (finding a rational basis for dis-
tinctions among cable television facilities under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 
 118 Professor Volokh, among others, accepts the use of Ginsberg as a precedent for the govern-
ment's interest in limiting non-obscene speech to protect children, and fails to note that Ginsberg 
did not implicate either indecency or strict scrutiny. See Volokh, supra note 19, at 176-86. 
 
 119 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 769 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority 
for curtailing First Amendment protections when the speech in question is not obscene to youths). 
 
 120 See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1261-62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (uphold-
ing FCC forfeiture procedures for violation of a statute prohibiting obscene, indecent, or profane 
language on the radio). 
 
 121 The FCC has relied on the definition of indecency it used in Pacifica in developing regulation 
since then. See Edythe Wise, A Historical Perspective on the Protection of Children From Broad-
cast Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 15, 17, 33-34 (1996) (applauding the FCC's en-
forcement of the obscenity, indecency, and profanity prohibition in the least restrictive manner, 
while protecting the right to privacy in the home). The Supreme Court, however, never expressly 
examined the definition of indecency at issue in Pacifica, or in any subsequent case. See Action for 
Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT I"), 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has never examined whether the FCC definition of indecency was unconstitutionally 
vague, and expressly asking the Supreme Court for guidance as to whether Pacifica should be read 
as an implicit acceptance of the "generic" definition of indecency), cited in Alliance for Community 
Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 130 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (finding that the Su-
preme Court has "never actually passed on the FCC's broad definition of 'indecency'"), rev'd in part 
sub nom. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (failing to define 
indecency). Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly criticized the legislative branch for its failure 
to define indecency in statutes seeking to control such speech. See National Endowment for the Arts 
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589-90 (1998) (upholding the statutory scheme of NEA review of applica-
 tions for financial grants); Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU I"), 521 U.S. 844, 867, 871 (1997) (criticizing the 
uncertainty of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 for undermining Congress's objective of 
protecting minors from potentially harmful materials). 
 
 122 ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 849. 
 
 123 Id. at 871 n.35 (assuming, arguendo, that "patently offensive" is synonymous with "indecent" as 
used in the Act). The Supreme Court's most recent opinion on indecent speech also failed to define 
the nature of that speech, reserving interpretation of the congressional definition ("general standards 
of decency") to a federal administrative agency. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 589 (holding that Congress 
may instruct the National Endowment for the Arts to decline to fund art that may offend general 
standards of decency). 
 
 124 ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 872 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). 
 
 125 See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 132 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 
 126 Id. 
 
 127 Id. 
 
 128 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 
 129 Justice Stevens' plurality opinions in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978), 
and Young v. American Mini-theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 65-66 (1976), suggested that patently of-
fensive or indecent speech might have only "slight social value," but that proposition did not com-
mand a majority. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 n.6 (1992) (rejecting Justice 
Stevens' assertion "that selective regulation of speech based on content is not presumptively valid.") 
Writing for seven Justices in ACLU I, Justice Stevens no longer took the position that there is a slid-
ing scale of value assigned to indecent speech. See Volokh, supra note 19, at 144-45. 
 
 130 See Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU I"), 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997) (discussing Sable, 492 U.S. at 128). 
 
 131 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.R.2d 
94, 98 (1975)). Justice Stevens never addressed the question of whether the government had alleged 
a compelling interest in protecting children, but rather appeared to take the government's interest at 
face value. See id. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (citing only Ginsberg, and failing to 
note that Ginsberg was inapposite because it applied a rational basis test); see also Dial Info. Servs. 
v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1541 (1991) (noting that both the FCC and Congress have tracked 
the definition approved in Pacifica in post-Sable attempts to regulate dial-a-porn). But the Supreme 
Court emphasized in Pacifica itself and in subsequent references to its opinion therein that Pacifica 
is a narrow holding, limited to its facts, including a heavily regulated form of media, an afternoon 
 broadcast, and the unique pervasiveness and accessibility of the medium to young children. See 
ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (distinguishing Pacifica); Sable, 492 U.S. at 128 (observing that when 
the recipient of speech must take affirmative steps to obtain communications, Pacifica doctrine does 
not apply). 
 
 132 Wise, supra note 121, at 17 (citing Pacifica, 428 U.S. at 732) (tracing legal developments that 
led the FCC "to narrow the focus of indecency regulation to children"); see also Lili Levi, The FCC, 
Indecency, and Anti-Abortion Political Advertising, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 85, 112 (1996) 
(observing that Justice Stevens' definition of indecency as "nonconformance with accepted stan-
dards of morality" in Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740, would give the FCC wide range to expand the no-
tion of indecency in order to protect children). 
 
 133 See, e.g., James Gerstenzang, Clinton Sees Violent Influence in 3 Video Games Media, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, at A12 (reporting that President Clinton urges parents, Hollywood, and 
software producers to resist products that glorify violence); Richard Lacayo, Violent Reaction, 
TIME, June 12, 1995, at 24 (discussing the devisive debate over who is responsible for sex and vio-
lence in popular culture). See generally BOK, supra note 27. 
 
 134 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (finding hate speech including cross burning to be protected expres-
sion); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519 (1947) (finding that the First Amendment protects 
communications depicting deeds of bloodshed, lust and crime); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. 
Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that depictions of violence alone do not fall 
within the definition of obscenity for either minors or adults); Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 448 F. 
Supp. 306, 394 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (outlining the Miller test for obscenity). 
 
 135 Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (incitement); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (fighting words). A radio or television show, or Internet communi-
cation that urged children to find their parents' guns immediately and go shoot someone would be 
subject to regulation or liability under Brandenberg. Cf. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 
40 (Cal. 1975) (finding no First Amendment defense for a radio contest causing personal injury). 
 
 136 The Commission referred to the dilemma posed by how to treat Peter Pan, where the crocodile 
eats Captain Hook. See Wise, supra note 121, at 34-35 (citing Report on the Broadcast of Violent, 
Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.R.2d 418, 418-419 (1975) (responding to TELEVISION 
AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE, A REPORT TO THE 
SURGEON GENERAL FROM THE SURGEON GENERAL'S SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1972))). One can easily see the 
problems in trying to classify other children's classics such as Bambi, who sees his mother shot by a 
hunter, or Babar, whose mother is similarly dispatched at the beginning of the first volume. 
 
 137 Alison Mitchell & Frank Bruni, House Undertakes Days-Long Battle on Youth Violence, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 1999, at A1, A26 (quoting Representative Mark Foley). The statute being debated, 
the Children's Defense Act of 1999, was touted as reaching all violence in the media. But the defini-
 tion of speech subject to regulation was a variable obscenity definition that expressly included "sa-
distic or masochistic activity, . . . acts of mutilation of the human body, or rape." H.R. 206, 106th 
Cong. § 1471(b)(3) (1999). 
 
 138 See Amy Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expres-
sion, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1506 (1996) (arguing that it is impossible to define terms such as "por-
nography," "art," or "hate speech" coherently). 
 
 139 See Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU I"), 521 U.S. 844, 871 (1997). Prison rape, for example, may be of 
particular concern to young people, who are increasingly confined in adult prisons where they are 
commonly the subjects of sexual assault. See Amy E. Webbink, Access Denied: Incarcerated Juve-
niles and Their Right of Access to Courts, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 613, 630 (1999) (find-
ing that children in adult facilities are five times as likely as children in juvenile facilities to be 
sexually assaulted). 
 
 140 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 
 141 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 582 (1998) (quoting Rep. Ronald 
Coleman). 
 
 142 See Pope, 481 U.S. at 504. 
 
 143 Id. (holding it is harmless error to convict under an obscenity statute based on a community 
standard of value rather than a reasonable person standard). 
 
 144 Id. at 505. 
 
 145 Id. 
 
 146 Two additional doctrines must be satisfied for a regulation on speech to survive judicial scru-
tiny. The rule against vagueness requires that the regulation be drawn with sufficient precision so 
that persons who seek to exercise their First Amendment rights will have notice of the speech being 
regulated. The rule against overbreadth demands that the regulation cover only that conduct which 
is subject to control under the Constitution and that it not extend either to protected conduct or to 
conduct which it is unnecessary to control in order to accomplish the government's goal. See 
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 364-65 (1970). 
 
 147 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478, 514-15 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding a com-
pelling governmental interest in controlling potentially misleading speech in a class action litigation 
determined by the nature of the speech and the scope of the interference with speech imposed by the 
governmental regulation). Since Pacifica, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected government 
arguments that something less than "strict scrutiny" is required when the government seeks to pro-
 tect minors. The government, however, continues to make, and courts at least to consider, that ar-
gument. At oral argument in Playboy II, the government urged same deference under what it char-
acterized as "not quite strict scrutiny" requiring a compelling interest because the regulation is con-
tent-based. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 1999 WL 1134595, at * 2, Playboy Entertainment 
Group, Inc. v. United States ("Playboy II"), No. 98-1682 (Nov. 30, 1999); see also FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (stating that Pacifica is a narrow holding); Fabulous Assoc., 
Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 783-84 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting the state's 
argument that a lesser standard of scrutiny applies). In ACLU I, the government conceded that strict 
scrutiny applied.  Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU I"), 521 U.S. 844, 863 n.30 (1997). A lesser standard 
might, however, apply if the speech were both controversial and commercial. See Consolidated Edi-
son Co. v. Public Servs. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980); supra note 16. 
Eugene Volokh has criticized the continued use of the strict scrutiny doctrine as leading to unpre-
dictable results. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending 
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2441-43 (1996). My argument suggests that rather than 
seeking a new method of analysis, the courts should apply strict scrutiny seriously. 
 
 148 See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1981). While not necessarily framed explic-
itly as a balancing test, "strict scrutiny" analysis requires judges to compare the weight of two im-
portant interests--the government's compelling interest and the individual liberty interest--against 
each other, knowing that one will be compromised. See Volokh, supra note 19, at 167-68. Many 
scholars have argued that the compelling interest will almost always trump the liberty interest under 
strict scrutiny. See id. at 169 & n.86 (discussing the "compelling interest trumps" approach as the 
"conventionalwisdom"). 
If the compelling interest does generally trump, it becomes even more important to begin the analy-
sis by examining whether the asserted interest holds up to scrutiny. The Supreme Court, however, 
has repeatedly failed to do so. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU I"), 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (ex-
amining whether there are less restrictive alternatives to the regulation of speech at issue); Sable 
Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 134 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) ("The Govern-
ment has a strong interest in protecting children against exposure to pornographic material that 
might be harmful to them."); Pope, 481 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Government may not 
constitutionally criminalize mere possession or sale of obscene literature, absent some connection to 
minors."); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that obscenity is constitutionally protected "at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles"); 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-650 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (distinguishing chil-
dren's rights to access speech from adults' rights). 
 
 149 See C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW 5-11 (2d ed. 1999) 
(describing the leading rationales for the special status accorded to freedom of expression: the mar-
ketplace, democratic, and liberty models.) 
 
 150 See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245, 249-50 (1936) (discussing the history 
of American and English constitutional protections of speech). 
 
  151 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), rev'd in part, Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 
 152 See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 298 (1995). 
 
 153 Free Speech occupies a special status in contemporary legal discourse on civil liberties. See 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information As Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on 
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 676 (1992) (stating that "free 
speech ranks high" in discussion of civil liberties). 
 
 154 See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) (Brennan, J.) (overturning a statute that barred 
candidates from promising to reduce their own salaries if elected, on the grounds that the "State's 
fear that the voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling 
justification for limiting speech"); see also id. at 62 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("[On different 
facts] I would give more weight to the State's interest."). 
 
 155 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 
485 (1960)) (holding that the asserted interest in protecting the electoral power of the citizens is not 
compelling absent a showing of imminent threat posed by corporate contributions, and that there 
was no "substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted" and the regu-
lation on speech); see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322-24, 329 (1988) (O'Connor, J.) (analyzing 
but not resolving the question of whether a regulation barring offensive signs near foreign embas-
sies serves a compelling government interest, since the statute was, in any event not narrowly tai-
lored); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (Powell, J.) (holding that the state does not 
have a sufficiently compelling interest in maintaining separation of church and state to justify con-
tent-based limitations on the access of student groups to a generally open forum). 
 
 156 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975). 
 
 157 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118-120 
(1991) (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)) (holding that 
the state Board's assertion that the state has a compelling interest in classifying criminal assets to 
ensure "that criminals do not profit from storytelling about their crimes before their victims have a 
meaningful opportunity to be compensated" is "hardly compelling," but finding a compelling inter-
est in depriving criminals of the profits of their crimes and in using such profits to compensate vic-
tims but holding that the statute was not narrowly tailored to advance the latter interest.) 
 
 158 See First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 786, 788-89. The burden is on the government to show a com-
pelling interest, which the Court held was not "supported by the record or legislative findings" in 
this matter. Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976)); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. 
Supp. 824, 851 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ("ACLU I"). The government conceded 
at oral argument that it has the burden of proof to show a compelling interest. See id. 
  
 159 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 
 160 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
Blackmun, J., and Souter, J.) (citing Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 
1985)) (overturning the "must-carry" provisions, which required cable broadcasters to provide 
channels for all local broadcast networks, which the Court considered as a contentneutral limitation 
on speech). Regarding the unanimity of the Justices on this point in Turner, see id. at 670 n.1 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring), id. at 680-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined by 
Scalia, J., Ginsburg, J., and Thomas, J.) ("It is not enough that the goals of the law be legitimate, or 
reasonable, or even praiseworthy. There must be some pressing public necessity, some essential 
value that has to be preserved, . . ." i.e., a compelling interest), and id. at 685 (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part). See also Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 
1997) (interpreting Turner to hold that the government must present "substantial supporting evi-
dence" to justify a law regulating speech). 
 
 161 United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466-67 (1995). 
 
 162 See id. at 467-68. 
 
 163 See id. at 475-76. The burden is not a "reasonable response to the posited harms," when the 
regulation of speech "heightens the government's burden of justification." Id. 
 
 164 See id. at 475 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 664). 
 
 165 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 
972 (1987) (arguing that constitutional balancing by the Court has recently been guided by liberal 
policies, instead of more rigorous investigations of rights, principles, and structures). 
 
 166 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Speech implicating 
rights of political expression, civil rights or political association can only be impinged upon to serve 
a "compelling interest." See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431, 438 n.2 (1978); cf. Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (observing that speech derived from "racial or religious conceit," 
which incites violence or breaches of the peace may be appropriately punished by the states). In 
contrast, commercial speech, while protected, may be assessed under a lesser standard. See Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. Public Servs. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980). 
 
 167 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991). 
 
 168 See Brief for the Appellants, 1997 WL 32931, at * 19-22, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) 
(No. 96-511)("ACLU I"); Brief for the Cross-Appellants/Appellees, 1988 LEXIS U.S. Briefs 515, at 
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